Thomas Barwin v. Village of Oak Park, 54 F.4th 443

Barwin was hired in 2006 as Oak Park Village Manager on an at-will basis; the IMRF pension vests after eight years.
Village President Pope told Barwin he could purchase reciprocal out-of-state pension credits (a process requiring Board approval); the complaint alleges five prior Village approvals for such purchases.
The written employment agreement required IMRF participation, contained an integration clause, and §19A promised the Employee the highest benefits enjoyed by comparable employees “by practice.”
In Feb. 2012 the Board pressured Barwin to resign or be fired; he resigned, was ~2.5 years short of vesting, requested permission to purchase out-of-state credits, and the Board never acted on that request.
Barwin sued for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing: (1) alleging the Village forced him out to prevent pension vesting, and (2) alleging it breached the contract by refusing to permit him to purchase out-of-state credits despite an established practice.
The district court dismissed the first claim at the pleading stage, allowed the second claim to proceed (Village later failed to timely answer and facts were deemed admitted), but then granted summary judgment to the Village on the §19A/practice claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal of claim 1, reversed summary judgment on claim 2, and remanded.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether forcing Barwin to resign to prevent pension vesting breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing	Barwin: Village ousted him with improper motive to avoid pension liability, so covenant bars opportunistic termination	Village: Barwin was an at-will employee; contract contained no promise to employ until vesting, so termination—even for cost reasons—was permitted	Dismissed: as an at-will employee Barwin had no enforceable expectation of continued employment until pension vested; no actionable breach shown
Whether §19A’s grant of benefits “by practice” created a contractual right to purchase out-of-state pension credits and whether Village breached that practice by denying Barwin’s request	Barwin: §19A incorporated a Village practice (past approvals, including his predecessor) so he reasonably expected permission to purchase credits; refusal breached duty of good faith	Village: Five approvals over decades (last in 2001) are too few and too stale to establish a current practice; integration clause bars reliance on Pope’s oral assurances	Reversed summary judgment: a reasonable factfinder could find an ongoing practice; Pope’s statements and prior approvals are admissible as evidence of practice; remanded for further proceedings

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (pleading standard: "plausible on its face")
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (Twombly standard applied to factual plausibility)
Jordan v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1987) (at-will employment: covenant bars avowedly opportunistic discharges)
LaScola v. U.S. Sprint Commc'ns, 946 F.2d 559 (7th Cir. 1991) (implied duty of good faith in Illinois contracts)
Dayan v. McDonald’s Corp., 466 N.E.2d 958 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984) (discharge to deprive employee of anticipated benefits can violate covenant)
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960) (past practice/industry "law of the shop" can be part of agreement interpretation)
Grassini v. DuPage Twp., 665 N.E.2d 860 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (principle limiting binding successors in political subdivisions)
Hostrop v. Bd. of Jr. Coll. Dist. No. 515, 523 F.2d 569 (7th Cir. 1975) (successor governing body may adopt/ratify predecessors’ contractual acts)