86 F.4th 1168
6th Cir.
2023
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Background

  • Forty-seven current and former salaried engineers in FCA’s AMEPT division were moved in 2011 from the Chrysler Technical Center (Auburn Hills) to Trenton, increasing commute time and related costs and (they allege) violating the CBA’s transfer provisions.
  • Plaintiffs filed grievances in 2015 (stopped at the union’s second step) and 2017 (withdrawn; appeal deemed untimely). A 2017 federal indictment exposed a broad FCA–UAW bribery scheme that plaintiffs say affected the transfer and grievance handling.
  • Plaintiffs filed a substantially similar grievance in 2018 and, after exhausting internal union remedies, received a favorable determination that they could pursue external remedies in May 2020.
  • Plaintiffs sued FCA, the UAW, and individuals on October 16, 2020, asserting hybrid LMRA claims (breach of CBA + breach of duty of fair representation), RICO, and related state-law claims.
  • The district court dismissed the LMRA and RICO claims as time-barred under the applicable statutes of limitations and declined supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims. Plaintiffs appealed.

Issues

Issue Plaintiff's Argument Defendant's Argument Held
When did plaintiffs’ hybrid §301/fair-representation (LMRA) claim accrue for the 2011 transfer? Accrual was tolled or reset by later grievances (2017/2018) and by the 2017 indictment revealing bribery. Accrual occurred when the union abandoned the grievance in 2015 (second-step non-pursuit); six-month limitations started then. Court: Accrual began in 2015 when the grievance was abandoned; LMRA six-month rule bars the claim.
Can the 2017 or 2018 grievances restart the six‑month LMRA limitations period? The 2018 grievance added bribery allegations and thus was a new claim that reset the clock. Repeated grievances on the same underlying conduct do not restart the limitations period; 2018 was a recast of the 2015 grievance. Court: 2018 grievance did not meaningfully change the underlying claim; it cannot dodge the six-month limitations, so claims remain untimely.
When do plaintiffs’ civil RICO claims accrue? Accrual should await discovery of both injury and the RICO pattern (injury-and-pattern rule); or equitable doctrines should toll accrual. Accrual follows the Supreme Court’s injury-discovery rule (Rotella): clock runs when plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury; RICO has a four-year limitations period. Court: RICO claims accrued when plaintiffs knew of their injuries (2011–2012); claims are time-barred under the four‑year rule.
Do equitable tolling or the separate‑accrual rule salvage the RICO claims? Equitable tolling/fraudulent concealment (and separate‑accrual for new predicate acts) should extend or restart the limitations period given the bribery scheme’s concealment and subsequent acts. Plaintiffs lacked diligence and point to no new injury-causing predicate act within the limitations period that produced distinct harm; tolling/separate-accrual do not apply. Court: Denied equitable tolling for lack of diligence; separate‑accrual inapplicable because there is no new distinct injury from later acts—RICO claims untimely.

Key Cases Cited

  • Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549 (U.S. 2000) (adopts injury‑discovery accrual rule for civil RICO claims)
  • Klehr v. A.O. Smith Corp., 521 U.S. 179 (U.S. 1997) (separate‑accrual rule permits recovery for distinct injuries from later predicate acts but cannot bootstrap earlier acts)
  • DelCostello v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151 (U.S. 1983) (hybrid §301/fair‑representation claim framework)
  • Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley–Duff & Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143 (U.S. 1987) (four‑year statute of limitations for civil RICO)
  • Saunders v. Ford Motor Co., 879 F.3d 742 (6th Cir. 2018) (limitations begins when union abandons grievance—second‑stage decision can trigger accrual)
  • Robinson v. Cent. Brass Mfg. Co., 987 F.2d 1235 (6th Cir. 1993) (accrual when arbitration deadline passes without union action)
  • Noble v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 32 F.3d 997 (6th Cir. 1994) (accrual when union steward refuses to pursue claim)
  • Gen. Motors, LLC v. FCA US, LLC, 44 F.4th 548 (6th Cir. 2022) (pleading‑stage standard: factual allegations govern a Rule 12(b)(6) review)
  • Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (U.S. 2009) (plausibility standard for pleadings)
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