Thistlethwaite v. Elements Behavioral Health, Inc.
1:14-cv-00138
D.N.M.Mar 23, 2015Background
- Kyle Thistlethwaite (age 19) enrolled in a voluntary 90‑day inpatient drug treatment program at San Cristobal Treatment Center (SCTC) beginning October 26, 2012; his parents Patricia and Paul paid $40,000.
- SCTC announced it would cease operations on January 2, 2013 and closed five days later, 16 days short of the 90‑day term. Plaintiffs allege premature closure disrupted Kyle’s care and led to relapse(s).
- Plaintiffs assert multiple claims; the motion at issue seeks partial summary judgment on Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED), Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress (NIED), and breach of implied contract theories.
- Record: Kyle acknowledged feeling abandoned and that he relapsed after discharge; his parents testified to emotional distress but neither parent sought medical/mental‑health treatment tied to the closure. Kyle was over 18 and made treatment decisions; he had planned to attend an aftercare program (Real Recovery) after 90 days.
- Plaintiffs opposed with largely non‑specific factual denials and a brief nine‑line argument; the court found Plaintiffs failed to create material factual disputes supporting the three claims.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether SCTC’s premature closure supports IIED | Closure was “haphazard” and defendants knew Kyle’s vulnerability; caused severe emotional distress | Closure, at most, amounted to negligence; plaintiffs offer no extreme/outrageous conduct or evidence of recklessness | Summary judgment for defendants — IIED fails (no extreme/outrageous conduct, insufficient proof of severe distress causally tied to conduct) |
| Whether parents can recover under NIED as bystanders | Parents suffered severe emotional distress from son’s relapse following closure | NIED in NM limited to bystanders who contemporaneously and sensorially perceive a sudden traumatic injury to a family member; parents did not witness relapses | Summary judgment for defendants — NIED fails (parents did not witness injury; Kyle cannot claim bystander NIED himself) |
| Whether Kyle (or plaintiffs) can assert breach of implied contract for post‑90‑day treatment | Plaintiffs infer an agreement or tacit understanding that treatment could be extended beyond 90 days | Written payment plan fixed treatment term; Kyle (an adult) was the decisionmaker regarding further treatment; no meeting of the minds or conduct showing assent to continued SCTC treatment | Summary judgment for defendants — no evidence of an implied‑in‑fact agreement to extend treatment beyond the 90‑day term |
| Whether Elements is liable under agency/vicarious liability theories for IIED/NIED | Elements can be liable under apparent agency or vicarious liability for SCTC/TRS acts | If underlying tort claims fail against SCTC/TRS, agency claims against Elements also fail | Summary judgment for Elements as well, because the underlying tort claims fail |
Key Cases Cited
- Gioia v. Pinkerton’s Inc., 194 F. Supp. 2d 1207 (D.N.M. 2002) (IIED requires extreme/outrageous conduct and severe distress; ordinary sadness is insufficient)
- Trujillo v. N. Rio Arriba Elec. Coop., 131 N.M. 607 (N.M. 2004) (describes the high standard for outrageous conduct in IIED claims)
- Baldonado v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 143 N.M. 297 (N.M. Ct. App. 2008) (contrast where truly horrific facts supported IIED claims)
- Fernandez v. Walgreen Hastings Co., 126 N.M. 263 (N.M. 1998) (NIED limited to bystander who contemporaneously observes a sudden traumatic event causing serious injury or death)
- Folz v. State, 110 N.M. 457 (N.M. 1990) (elements for NIED bystander recovery)
- Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (summary judgment burden allocation and when moving party may prevail)
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (summary judgment standard regarding genuine issues of material fact)
- Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (summary judgment and the requirement that a rational trier of fact could find for the nonmoving party)
- Orion Technical Resources, LLC v. Los Alamos Nat. Sec., LLC, 287 P.3d 967 (N.M. Ct. App. 2012) (definition and proof of implied‑in‑fact contracts)