311 F. Supp. 3d 739
M.D.N.C.2018Background
- Andrew Thiessen worked as a tear down technician for Stewart‑Haas from Jan. 2013 to Jan. 31, 2017; the job involved cutting sheet metal and occasional cuts.
- Thiessen learned he was HIV‑positive in Nov. 2015 and told HR director Donna Lawing; Lawing kept the diagnosis confidential and told him to be careful.
- Thiessen requested transfers in Dec. 2015 and Dec. 2016 (to other departments/teams); he alleges at least one coworker received a transfer while he did not.
- By late 2016 coworkers knew of his HIV status and some expressed fear; Stewart‑Haas asserts Thiessen exposed others to bloodborne pathogens and terminated him on Jan. 31, 2017 for "creating an unsafe working environment." Thiessen disputes the factual basis for termination.
- Thiessen filed an EEOC charge on May 6, 2017 alleging discrimination based on disability and wrongful termination; the charge did not mention requests for accommodation, failure to promote, or retaliation. EEOC issued right‑to‑sue on Oct. 23, 2017.
- Stewart‑Haas moved to dismiss Thiessen’s failure to accommodate, failure to promote, and retaliation claims for lack of subject‑matter jurisdiction (failure to exhaust administrative remedies); the court granted the motion and dismissed those claims without prejudice.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Thiessen exhausted administrative remedies for failure to accommodate claim | Thiessen contends his EEOC charge alleging disability discrimination reasonably covers accommodation requests and related claims | Stewart‑Haas says the EEOC charge only alleges wrongful termination and includes no accommodation request or related facts | Held: No exhaustion; accommodation claim not in EEOC charge and not reasonably related — dismissed without prejudice |
| Whether Thiessen exhausted administrative remedies for failure to promote/transfer claim | Thiessen argues transfer requests support a failure to promote theory and are related to his EEOC disability charge | Stewart‑Haas contends the charge references only termination and a different timeframe and actors, so it does not encompass promotion/transfer claims | Held: No exhaustion; failure to promote/transfer claims involve different timeframes/actors/conduct and exceed EEOC charge scope — dismissed without prejudice |
| Whether retaliation claim was exhausted via the EEOC charge | Thiessen notes he checked "disability" on the charge and asserts retaliation is covered; also argues EEOC forms lack an "ADA retaliation" box | Stewart‑Haas points out the EEOC charge left the "Retaliation" box unchecked and the narrative alleges only discriminatory termination | Held: No exhaustion; retaliation box was not checked and narrative contained no retaliation allegations — claim dismissed without prejudice |
Key Cases Cited
- Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83 (threshold jurisdiction must be addressed before merits)
- Evans v. B.F. Perkins Co., 166 F.3d 642 (4th Cir. 1999) (Rule 12(b)(1) and consideration of evidence outside the pleadings)
- Chacko v. Patuxent Inst., 429 F.3d 505 (4th Cir. 2005) (scope of federal suit determined by contents of EEOC charge; charges construed liberally but not expanded)
- Balas v. Huntington Ingalls Indus., Inc., 711 F.3d 401 (4th Cir. 2013) (court may not read allegations into administrative charges they do not contain)
- Sydnor v. Fairfax Cty., Va., 681 F.3d 591 (4th Cir. 2012) (ADA incorporates Title VII administrative exhaustion requirements)
- Jones v. Calvert Group, Ltd., 551 F.3d 297 (4th Cir. 2009) (contents of charge determine scope of subsequent federal suit)