THIBAULT v. GARCIA
2017 OK CIV APP 36
| Okla. Civ. App. | 2017Background
- On September 4, 2013 James E. Thibault filed a negligence petition alleging he was injured by a car driven by Eva M. Garcia; he did not cause summons to issue at filing.
- Service was not effected within 180 days; Garcia filed a special appearance and motion to dismiss on March 9, 2015 relying on 12 O.S. Supp. 2013 § 2004(I).
- Section 2004(I) provides that if service is not made within 180 days and plaintiff cannot show good cause, the action "shall be deemed dismissed" as to that defendant without prejudice.
- Thibault filed an amended petition and caused summons to issue after Garcia moved to dismiss; he argued the amendment reset the 180-day period (not pursued on appeal).
- The district court sustained Garcia’s motion and entered a journal entry dismissing the case effective April 15, 2015; this appeal challenges the effective date of dismissal.
- The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the dismissal but held the operative dismissal date was March 4, 2014 (181 days after the original filing), because the statute mandates automatic dismissal when no good cause is shown.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a petition not served within 180 days is "deemed dismissed" as of the 181st day or only when the court later orders dismissal | Thibault argued his amended petition filed after the motion tolled or reset the 180-day period and thus dismissal should relate to the court's later order | Garcia argued the statute mandates automatic dismissal 181 days after filing if no good cause is shown, regardless of when the court later rules | Court held the statute is clear: if no good cause, the action is deemed dismissed as of day 181 (March 4, 2014) |
Key Cases Cited
- Mott v. Carlson, 786 P.2d 1247 (1990) (interpreting §2004(I) and characterizing the statute’s second-sentence dismissal language as clear and automatic)
- Fischer v. Baptist Health Care of Oklahoma, 14 P.3d 1292 (2000) (earlier statute version used "may be dismissed," establishing discretionary dismissal)
- Willis v. Sequoyah House, Inc., 194 P.3d 1285 (2008) (reaffirming discretion where statute said "may")
- Moore v. Sneed, 839 P.2d 682 (1992 OK CIV APP) (affirming dismissal as of the 181st day under the original statute)
- Stockbridge Energy, LLC v. Taylor, 359 P.3d 181 (2015) (limits collateral effects of later orders to avoid creating indefinite refiling windows)
- Colclazier & Assocs. v. Stephens, 277 P.3d 1285 (2012 OK CIV APP) (applied retroactively an amended §2004(I) and implied dismissal as of day 181)