THIBAULT v. GARCIA
2017 OK CIV APP 36
| Okla. Civ. App. | 2017Background
- On Sept. 4, 2013 Thibault filed a negligence petition against Garcia for a Jan. 27, 2013 car-accident injury but did not cause summons to be issued then.
- 180 days after filing passed without service; Thibault never showed good cause for the delay under 12 O.S. Supp. 2013 § 2004(I).
- On March 9, 2015 (≈550 days after filing) Garcia filed a special appearance and moved to dismiss under § 2004(I), arguing the petition was deemed dismissed as of March 4, 2014 (the 181st day).
- Thibault filed an amended petition on March 13, 2015 and later argued the amendment restarted the 180-day period; the district court rejected that argument and sustained Garcia's motion.
- The district court's journal entry dismissed the case effective April 15, 2015; the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed but modified the effective dismissal date to March 4, 2014 (181 days after filing).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a petition not served within § 2004(I)'s 180 days is "deemed dismissed" as of the 181st day or instead dismissed only on the district court's dismissal order date | Amendment filed before a responsive pleading restarts/extends the 180-day period, allowing a later effective dismissal date | The statute's "shall be deemed dismissed" language mandates dismissal by operation of law on the 181st day if no good cause is shown | The 2013 version of § 2004(I) is clear and mandatory: if no good cause, the action is deemed dismissed as of day 181; court affirmed dismissal and modified effective date to March 4, 2014 |
Key Cases Cited
- Mott v. Carlson, 786 P.2d 1247 (1990) (construed earlier § 2004(I) and treated untimely service as resulting in dismissal by operation of law)
- Fischer v. Baptist Health Care of Oklahoma, 14 P.3d 1292 (2000) (interpreted a prior "may be dismissed" version as discretionary)
- Willis v. Sequoyah House, Inc., 194 P.3d 1285 (2008) (recognized dismissal discretion under the prior statutory wording)
- Stockbridge Energy, LLC v. Taylor, 359 P.3d 181 (2015) (limits on refiling and interplay with statutes of limitation/savings clauses)