Theodore Wilson v. Timothy Cox
410 U.S. App. D.C. 131
| D.C. Cir. | 2014Background
- Theodore Wilson, a retired veteran, was hired in 2001 as a security guard at the Armed Forces Retirement Home–Washington and became a resident in 2002 to continue working. He was about 71 when terminated in January 2004.
- AFRH Chief Operating Officer Timothy Cox eliminated the Home’s resident employee program and replaced it with a stipend program that limited resident work and pay, causing Wilson’s termination.
- Cox told residents, “you didn’t come here to work, you came here to retire,” and told Wilson’s EEO counselor he was concerned that older guards were “from time to time… found asleep.” Cox cited cost savings, workforce training, and consistency with the Gulfport facility as nondiscriminatory reasons.
- Wilson filed administrative complaints, received unfavorable EEO and MSPB outcomes, then sued under the ADEA and later sought to add a due process claim. The district court granted summary judgment for defendants before Wilson conducted discovery and denied leave to amend the due process claim.
- The D.C. Circuit reviews the record in Wilson’s favor and holds that Cox’s statements constitute direct evidence of age stereotyping, warranting reversal and remand for trial; it leaves the due process claim for the district court to consider on remand.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Cox’s statements are direct evidence of age discrimination under the ADEA | Wilson: Cox’s comments reflect age-based stereotypes and show discriminatory intent, entitling him to trial | Defendants: Statements reflect retirement policy or performance concerns, not age bias | Reversed: Statements could permit a reasonable jury to find discriminatory intent; proceed to trial |
| Whether nondiscriminatory reasons (cost, training, uniformity) preclude ADEA liability | Wilson: Those reasons may be pretext if motivated by age bias | Defendants: Legitimate, non-pretextual reasons for abolishing the program | Court: Need not resolve pretext at summary judgment because direct evidence requires trial |
| Whether summary judgment before any discovery was proper | Wilson: Denial of discovery prejudiced his ability to oppose summary judgment | Defendants: No reversible error noted on this ground | Court: Remand for trial moots detailed discovery ruling; parties will have discovery opportunities |
| Whether leave to amend to add a due process claim should have been allowed | Wilson: As a preference-eligible veteran he has a property interest in continued employment | Defendants: District court deemed amendment futile under the theory presented earlier | Court: Declines to decide new due process theory on appeal and leaves it to district court on remand |
Key Cases Cited
- Ayissi-Etoh v. Fannie Mae, 712 F.3d 572 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (direct-evidence standard at summary judgment)
- Barnett v. PA Consulting Grp., Inc., 715 F.3d 354 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (ADEA and Title VII standards)
- Hampton v. Vilsack, 685 F.3d 1096 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (summary-judgment evidence drawn in non-moving party’s favor)
- Vatel v. Alliance of Auto. Mfrs., 627 F.3d 1245 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (definition of direct evidence)
- Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604 (1993) (age-stereotype rationale as basis for ADEA)
- Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985) (property-interest requirement for due process claim)