Theodore v. Lifeline Systems Co.
163 A.3d 654
Conn. App. Ct.2017Background
- Catherine Nuckols (decedent) subscribed to a Lifeline home medical alert system installed by VNA; system required line-seizure capability (RJ31X jack or correct splitter wiring) to dial out if a household phone was off-hook.
- On July 29, 2011, the decedent was found dead on her residence floor near a bathroom; the Lifeline communicator showed a flashing red light and telephone records indicated a phone had been off the hook for a long period.
- Plaintiff (administratrix of the estate) sued VNA (negligent installation and breach of contract) and Lifeline (product liability), alleging the system failed to transmit her distress signal, delaying or preventing emergency response and causing death or prolonged suffering.
- Plaintiff presented lay and expert testimony (EMT Wilson, primary physician Dr. Zagieboylo, installers, Lifeline employees, engineers) and documentary evidence but no autopsy; Dr. Zagieboylo opined a GI bleed was a contributing factor but could not say with medical probability it was the cause of death or that a timely ambulance would have saved her.
- After plaintiff rested, defendants moved for directed verdicts. The trial court granted them, finding plaintiff failed to prove causation (cause-in-fact and proximate cause) without resort to impermissible speculation; judgment entered for defendants. Plaintiff’s motion to set aside was denied and she appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of causation evidence for negligence and products liability | Plaintiff argued circumstantial and expert testimony (GI bleed + EMT arrival time) permitted a reasonable inference that a functioning Lifeline would have led to timely ambulance arrival and survival/reduction of suffering | Defendants argued plaintiff lacked proof that a functioning system would have caused survival or reduced suffering; critical causation questions were speculative | Court held plaintiff failed to prove cause-in-fact and proximate cause; directed verdict for defendants because key inferences required impermissible speculation |
| Applicability of Restatement (Second) § 323 (affirmative duty to respond) to relieve plaintiff of cause-in-fact burden | Plaintiff contended § 323 makes liability depend on increased risk or reliance and that she need only show foreseeable type of physical harm (e.g., collapse from GI bleed) rather than that defendants’ breach actually caused death | Defendants maintained plaintiff still had to prove that their breach caused the physical harm or death claimed | Court rejected plaintiff’s broader reading of § 323 and held she still bore the burden to show defendants’ conduct caused the injuries claimed; even under § 323, evidence was insufficient |
| Need for expert testimony on cause and duration of suffering | Plaintiff argued jury could rely on common experience and circumstantial evidence (EMT testimony and ambulance response time) rather than complex medical opinion | Defendants stressed the cause/timing of death were medical issues beyond common knowledge and required admissible expert proof | Court held causation required expert proof here; without reliable expert linking lack of response to survival or suffering, jury would be left to conjecture |
| Evidentiary rulings (excluded engineer report, lost income, probate costs) | Plaintiff claimed trial court wrongly excluded an engineer report and certain damages items | Defendants noted exclusions; court rulings not dispositive once directed verdict affirmed | Appellate court deemed evidentiary claims moot because causation failure was dispositive and did not reach merits of exclusions |
Key Cases Cited
- Stuart v. Freiberg, 316 Conn. 809 (2015) (negligent act must bear demonstrable relation to injury to be actionable)
- Giglio v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., 180 Conn. 230 (1979) (elements of strict products liability defined)
- Curran v. Kroll, 303 Conn. 845 (2012) (directed verdict standard; jury may not rely on speculation)
- Winn v. Posades, 281 Conn. 50 (2007) (cause-in-fact and proximate cause explained; plaintiff must prove unbroken causal sequence)