903 F.3d 32
3rd Cir.2018Background
- The Hayes family (originally Florence Hayes, Theodore Hayes, and Aqeela Fogle) lived in a project-based Section 8 unit at Washington Square East; the property owner opted out of the project-based program and tenants became eligible for enhanced vouchers when the PHA contract expired in 2009.
- New owner Philip Harvey purchased the property, executed HAP contracts and leases, and renewed the Hayes family’s lease several times; the lease expired April 30, 2015.
- After Florence Hayes died in 2015, Harvey notified the family he would not renew the lease and gave various reasons (death of Florence, planned renovation, intent to house his daughter); he threatened eviction when they did not vacate.
- Hayes and Fogle sued seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(t)(1)(B) (enhanced-voucher provision) gives enhanced-voucher tenants a statutory right to “elect to remain” that prevents eviction without good cause even at lease expiration.
- The District Court granted summary judgment to Harvey, holding the statute does not require renewal at the end of a lease; the Third Circuit (en banc) reversed: the statute grants an enforceable right to remain, and landlords may not evict enhanced-voucher tenants at lease-end without good cause; the case was remanded for factual inquiry on whether Harvey had good cause.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Hayes) | Defendant's Argument (Harvey) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 1437f(t)(1)(B)’s “may elect to remain” grants enhanced-voucher tenants an enforceable right against landlords that limits nonrenewal at lease-end | The statute gives tenants an affirmative right to elect to remain that restricts owners from nonrenewing leases absent good cause | The provision only requires HUD to provide enhanced vouchers; it does not impose obligations on owners or restrict their nonrenewal rights | Held: The statute, read in context and given the 2000 amendment, grants tenants an enforceable right to elect to remain; owners cannot evict at lease-end without good cause (reversed district court) |
| Whether the enhanced-voucher provision applies to subsequent owners who purchase post-opt-out | The statute’s scope is not limited to the original owner; enhanced-voucher protections follow the unit/project and bind subsequent owners | Harvey contended he purchased free of encumbrances and thus is not bound by Section 8 requirements | Held: Enhanced-voucher protections apply to subsequent owners of a former project-based property; ownership change does not nullify tenants’ statutory rights |
| Whether HUD’s long-standing interpretive guidance (that owners must continually renew enhanced-voucher leases absent good cause) is entitled to deference | HUD guidance supports tenants’ position and should be given weight under Skidmore | Harvey argued guidance lacks Chevron force and is not controlling | Held: HUD guidance, while not Chevron-controlling, is persuasive under Skidmore and supports the court’s interpretation |
| What standard defines “other good cause” for terminating enhanced-voucher tenancies at lease-end | Tenants argued ordinary-voucher good-cause standards should apply to protect tenants at lease-end | Owner argued no statutory obligation to renew and ordinary protections end with lease term | Held: Ordinary voucher provisions (42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o)(7)(C)) apply to enhanced vouchers, but “other good cause” is ambiguous; remanded for factual determination whether Harvey had good cause |
Key Cases Cited
- Milner v. Dep’t of the Navy, 562 U.S. 562 (2011) (canon against rendering statutory language superfluous)
- Ross v. Blake, 136 S. Ct. 1850 (2016) (presumption that amendments have real effect)
- Park Vill. Apartment Tenants Ass’n v. Mortimer Howard Tr., 636 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2011) (enhanced-voucher tenants have right to remain; HUD interpretation persuasive)
- Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944) (weight to give agency interpretations)
- United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001) (limits of Chevron and respect due to agency interpretations)
- TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19 (2001) (statutory interpretation principles regarding ambiguity)