Theodore Hayes v. Philip Harvey
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 20342
3rd Cir.2017Background
- The Hayes family lived in 538B Pine Street, a unit that converted from project-based Section 8 to tenant-based enhanced-voucher assistance after the owner opted out and HUD issued enhanced vouchers.
- Philip E. Harvey purchased the property, entered a HAP contract and lease accepting enhanced vouchers, with leases that renew annually; the family paid only their statutory share because HUD covered the excess rent as an enhanced voucher.
- After the head tenant died and the household head changed, Harvey notified the household he would not renew the lease at its natural expiration and served a notice to vacate.
- The Hayes family sued seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(t) creates an enforceable, ongoing “right to remain” that requires landlords to continually renew enhanced-voucher tenancies absent cause.
- The District Court granted summary judgment for Harvey; the Third Circuit (majority) AFFIRMED, holding § 1437f(t) does not obligate owners to continuously renew leases after their natural expiration, while the dissent argued the statute and HUD guidance create a landlord obligation to show cause to refuse renewal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Hayes) | Defendant's Argument (Harvey) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(t) creates a perpetual right to lease renewal / requires owners to continually renew enhanced-voucher tenancies | § 1437f(t)(1)(B) (“may elect to remain”) grants tenants a substantive right to remain, so owners must renew unless there is good cause | Statute is silent on nonrenewal; owners’ duties are governed by HAP contract and ordinary voucher rules; no perpetual renewal obligation | No — § 1437f(t) obligates HUD to pay enhanced assistance but does not limit owners’ nonrenewal rights; owners need not continually renew after lease expiration |
| Whether enhanced-voucher tenants are protected from eviction for nonpayment when owner refuses to accept vouchers | Enhanced-voucher protections require landlords to accept vouchers and preclude eviction for nonpayment | Owner may decline renewal and is not bound to accept continued tenancy after lease term | Tenants may not be evicted for nonpayment when owner refuses accepted enhanced-voucher payments midterm, but that principle (from other circuits) does not extend to forcing renewal at natural lease expiration here |
| Whether HUD’s interpretation (guidebook) requiring continual renewal is entitled to deference | HUD guidance supports a landlord obligation to renew absent good cause and merits deference | HUD guidance lacks Chevron force; the statute’s text controls | HUD guidance is not Chevron-binding; Skidmore-style respect is limited here because the agency’s reasoning in guidance is not persuasive enough to overcome the statute’s plain text |
| Whether § 1437f(t)(1)(C) exhaustively lists the only ways enhanced-voucher eligibility ends (thus implying owner nonrenewal is excluded) | Because (C) lists moves and voucher transfer but not owner nonrenewal, owners cannot terminate by nonrenewal without cause | (C) concerns HUD’s payment obligation; it does not displace ordinary voucher termination rules nor create perpetual tenancy | (C) addresses HUD’s payment duty and is not an exhaustive list of all events ending enhanced-voucher benefits; it does not preclude owner nonrenewal rights |
Key Cases Cited
- Barrientos v. 1801-1825 Morton LLC, 583 F.3d 1197 (9th Cir. 2009) (discusses Section 8 purpose and owner participation incentives)
- Park Vill. Apartment Tenants Ass’n v. Mortimer Howard Tr., 636 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2011) (held enhanced vouchers prevent eviction for refusing voucher payment and construed § 1437f(t) to protect tenants’ right to remain in certain contexts)
- Feemster v. BSA L.P., 548 F.3d 1063 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (discusses limits on landlord conduct with respect to voucher acceptance and eviction for nonpayment)
- Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576 (2000) (agency guidance without force of law is not entitled to Chevron deference)
- Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944) (agency interpretations may merit weight based on persuasiveness)
- United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001) (distinguishes Chevron deference and Skidmore respect for agency interpretations)
- Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001) (requires clear congressional statement for major policy shifts)
- Henson v. Santander Consumer USA, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1718 (2017) (courts apply, not amend, legislative policy choices)