Theodore D. Karantsalis v. City of Miami Springs, Florida, 17f4th1316

Background

Plaintiff Theodore Karantsalis was diagnosed with multiple sclerosis (MS) by 2008 and filed—but voluntarily dismissed—a pro se ADA/Rehabilitation Act claim then because his symptoms were mild and he lacked standing.
From 2017 his MS progressed: limp, falls, disabled parking permit (June 2017), reliance on crutches by late 2018; by June 2019 doctors prescribed a wheelchair and treatment.
In October 2019 he sued the City of Miami Springs under Title II of the ADA and §504 of the Rehabilitation Act, alleging inaccessible sidewalks, gym access, and parking that denied him the benefits of public services since 2017.
The City moved to dismiss, arguing the four‑year statute of limitations began in 2008 when Karantsalis knew of his MS and of the City’s noncompliant facilities.
The district court dismissed with prejudice, treating accrual as triggered by the 2008 diagnosis.
The Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that Karantsalis’s ADA cause of action did not accrue until at least 2017 when he suffered the denial of access (the cognizable ADA injury).

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
When does an ADA Title II/access claim accrue for statute‑of‑limitations purposes?	Accrual occurs when the plaintiff is actually injured—i.e., when disability progression causes denial of access (here, 2017).	Accrual occurred when plaintiff knew of his MS and the City’s noncompliance (2008), so suit is time‑barred.	Accrual occurs when the facts supporting the cause of action are or should be apparent; here, taking pleadings favorably, injury began in 2017, so the 2019 suit was timely.
Does a prior diagnosis (or knowledge of noncompliant facilities) start the limitations clock even if plaintiff then had no access injury?	No—knowledge of diagnosis alone does not create an ADA access injury absent denial of benefits.	Yes—diagnosis plus awareness of noncompliance meant plaintiff was injured in 2008.	Diagnosis alone is insufficient; the claim arises when plaintiff knew or should have known he was denied benefits because of his disability.
Can disease progression create a new accrual date?	Yes—progression that produces a cognizable denial of access starts the limitations period.	Progression is irrelevant; accrual tied to original condition/knowledge.	Progression can change accrual where it produces the concrete injury required for suit.
Was dismissal at 12(b)(6) appropriate where timeliness was disputed?	Pleadings allege injury beginning in 2017; not apparent on face that claim is time‑barred.	Timeliness is evident from prior complaint and diagnosis.	Dismissal was improper because it is not apparent from the complaint that the claim is time‑barred.

Key Cases Cited

Rozar v. Mullis, 85 F.3d 556 (11th Cir. 1996) (governs accrual: limitations begin when facts supporting cause of action are or should be apparent)
Frame v. City of Arlington, 657 F.3d 215 (5th Cir. 2011) (ADA access claim accrues when disabled person knows they were denied benefits; accrual dovetails with standing)
Chardon v. Fernandez, 454 U.S. 6 (U.S. 1981) (focus on when discriminatory act occurred—court here explains relevance differs in ADA access context)
United States ex rel. Hunt v. Cochise Consultancy, Inc., 887 F.3d 1081 (11th Cir. 2018) (dismissal on limitations grounds appropriate only if claim is obviously time‑barred on the complaint’s face)
Silva v. Baptist Health S. Fla., Inc., 856 F.3d 824 (11th Cir. 2017) (applies state personal‑injury limitations period to ADA/Rehab Act claims)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (U.S. 2007) (pleading must plausibly state a claim; used to evaluate sufficiency at motion to dismiss)