the University of Texas at Austin v. William A. Bellinghausen, Jr., 03-14-00749-CV

Background

Plaintiff William A. Bellinghausen fell on a protruding crack in a UT‑Austin sidewalk; UT‑Austin filed a plea to the jurisdiction seeking dismissal for lack of governmental immunity waiver.
David Henry, a UT facility staff member, observed an earlier fall the same morning and told the responding officer that the earlier person fell “right there” on the “same protruding crack.”
Henry’s contemporaneous statements appear in the police report and in an on‑scene audio recording; the investigating officer recorded that the prior fall was on the “same protruding crack.”
Three years later at deposition Henry qualified his prior statements—saying he meant the same “vicinity” and suggesting the earlier victim might have been using a cellphone—creating inconsistency with his on‑scene account.
Appellee argues Henry’s on‑scene statement and surrounding circumstantial facts (widespread uneven sidewalks, nearby tree roots, temporal proximity of falls) supply direct and circumstantial evidence of UT’s actual knowledge of the dangerous condition, making the plea to the jurisdiction improperly granted.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether there is a fact question on UT‑Austin's actual knowledge of the dangerous sidewalk condition	Henry’s contemporaneous on‑scene statement that someone fell “right there” on the “same protruding crack,” plus officer report and circumstantial evidence, show UT had actual notice before Bellinghausen’s fall	Henry’s later deposition recantation/clarification and alternative explanations undermine the claim of actual knowledge	The record contains a fact question—credibility/inconsistencies create an issue for the jury; plea to the jurisdiction was properly denied
Whether circumstantial evidence independently supports actual knowledge	Knowledge of widespread sidewalk cracks, proximity of a tree, and a close‑in prior fall make it reasonable to infer UT knew of the dangerous condition	Defendant argues such circumstantial evidence is insufficient without clearer proof linking the prior fall to the same defect	Court treats circumstantial evidence as bolstering the direct on‑scene statement; factual dispute remains for the factfinder
Whether the officer’s report and interpretation create a reasonable inference of notice	Officer Gonzalez’s report and photographs, informed by Henry’s statements and scene observation, support that Henry meant the same protruding crack	Defendant contends the officer inferred linkage and that the report does not conclusively prove Henry saw the same crack	The officer’s contemporaneous report contributes to a genuine fact issue about actual knowledge
Whether Henry’s distance/position means Bellinghausen necessarily knew the defect	Plaintiff: Henry was looking and had prior knowledge of campus cracks, so he could observe the cause; Bellinghausen was not looking and thus might not have noticed it	Defendant: proximity alone should not impute knowledge to UT or show Bellinghausen knew the hazard	Resolution of who saw what is a credibility question for the jury; not resolved on jurisdictional plea

Key Cases Cited

Casso v. Brand, 776 S.W.2d 551 (Tex. 1989) (credibility issues make summary disposition improper)
Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217 (Tex. 2004) (court may consider evidence when plea to jurisdiction challenges jurisdictional facts)
Marathon Corp. v. Pitzner, 106 S.W.3d 724 (Tex. 2003) (circumstantial proof must be bolstered by ‘something else’ to raise fact issue)
City of Corsicana v. Stewart, 249 S.W.3d 412 (Tex. 2008) (actual knowledge may be proven by direct or circumstantial evidence)
State v. Gonzalez, 82 S.W.3d 322 (Tex. 2002) (limits on drawing inferences from generalized knowledge)
City of San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 931 S.W.2d 535 (Tex. 1996) (combination of knowledge about leaks and rain supported inference of knowledge of dangerous condition)