the University of Texas at Austin v. John Sampson, 488 S.W.3d 332

Background

On Nov. 21, 2009, John Sampson (UT Austin law professor) tripped over an extension cord strung across a pedestrian walkway on campus and was injured.
Sampson sued the University under the Texas Tort Claims Act (TCA), asserting negligence, special defect, and premises-defect theories.
Evidence showed a third-party vendor (for a tailgate event) installed lights and used extension cords; University staff provided electrical services for the event and inspected the setup, but University presented evidence that it did not place or know of a cord at the accident location.
The University moved to dismiss/plead to the jurisdiction and for summary judgment asserting sovereign immunity except as waived by the TCA; the trial court denied those motions.
On interlocutory appeal the court reviewed whether Sampson established a TCA waiver: (1) whether his negligence claim was precluded because it was actually a premises-defect claim, (2) whether his special-defect theory applied, and (3) whether evidence showed the University had actual knowledge of a dangerous condition.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether general negligence claim under TCA §101.021(2) is viable when allegations describe a premises defect	Sampson contended negligence claim (failure to secure/warn about cord) is cognizable under §101.021(2)	University argued plaintiff’s allegations amount to a premises-defect and plaintiffs cannot evade premises-defect standards by recasting as general negligence	Court held claim was a premises-defect in substance; negligence claim not waived by TCA and thus dismissed
Whether the cord constituted a "special defect" (§101.022(b)) related to roads/streets	Sampson alleged special-defect (obstruction on a pathway between parking lot and law school)	University argued pathway not sufficiently related to a road/street to be a special defect	Court held pathway condition was not sufficiently related to a road/street; not a special defect
Whether Sampson presented evidence the University had "actual knowledge" of an unreasonably dangerous condition (premises-defect duty to licensee)	Sampson pointed to Univ. employees’ involvement in event setup, inspections, and evidence that Univ. personnel handled power/extension cords	University presented evidence it did not place or know of any cord at the location and had no reports of prior incidents; burden shifted to Sampson to raise a fact issue	Court held Sampson failed to produce evidence creating a genuine fact issue of actual knowledge; premises-defect claim dismissed for lack of jurisdiction
Whether the University’s sovereign immunity was waived under the TCA for the asserted claims	Sampson argued TCA waived immunity for his claims	University argued TCA did not waive immunity because requirements for premises/special-defect or negligent use of tangible personal property were not met	Court concluded TCA did not waive immunity for Sampson’s claims and reversed trial court; claims dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction

Key Cases Cited

Texas Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217 (Tex. 2004) (standard for reviewing jurisdictional plea with evidence and shifting burdens)
University of Texas-Pan American v. Aguilar, 251 S.W.3d 511 (Tex. 2008) (actual-knowledge inquiry for premises-defect claims; consider prior incidents/reports)
University of Texas at Austin v. Hayes, 327 S.W.3d 113 (Tex. 2010) (TCA waiver framework; special-defect discussion)
University of Texas at El Paso v. Muro, 341 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2009) (circumstantial evidence must create more than equally plausible inferences to show actual knowledge)
State Dep’t of Highways & Pub. Transp. v. Payne, 838 S.W.2d 235 (Tex. 1992) (legal question whether condition is a premises defect)
Rawlings v. Angelo State Univ., 648 S.W.2d 430 (Tex. App.—Austin 1983) (earlier treatment of similar fact pattern but decided before Miranda)