The State v. Young
339 Ga. App. 306
| Ga. Ct. App. | 2016Background
- At ~2:00 a.m., officers found Alfreda Young stopped in a middle lane of I-85, smelling of alcohol; she admitted drinking earlier and performed an HGN and a portable alcohol screening test that was positive.
- Young was arrested for DUI, handcuffed, and transported to the precinct; while handcuffed she was read Georgia’s implied-consent notice and immediately said “Yes” to submitting to a State-administered breath test.
- The Intoxilyzer 9000 breath test produced BAC readings of .160 and .151.
- Young moved in limine to exclude the breath results, arguing her consent was not voluntary; the trial court granted the motion, finding the State failed to prove actual voluntary consent.
- The Court of Appeals reviewed the videotape and implied-consent notice de novo and considered whether Young’s affirmative response constituted voluntary consent under the Fourth Amendment.
- The Court reversed: it held the totality of the circumstances showed Young gave free and voluntary consent to the breath test, and there was no coercion requiring exclusion.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether an arrestee’s affirmative response to implied-consent reading equals voluntary consent to a State-administered breath test | Young: her “Yes” was mere acquiescence to officer authority; she was handcuffed, not advised Miranda, and not told the test was optional | State: the implied-consent notice and circumstances establish actual, voluntary consent; no coercion present | Held: The State proved voluntary consent under the totality of circumstances; affirmative response was valid consent |
| Whether handcuffs or lack of Miranda warnings vitiate consent | Young: handcuffs and absence of Miranda undermined voluntariness | State: being handcuffed and not given Miranda does not automatically negate consent; Miranda is not required for consent to search | Held: Handcuffs and no Miranda did not negate voluntariness here |
| Whether the implied-consent warning’s language is coercive | Young: warning saying “Georgia law requires you to submit” suggests the test is mandatory, producing coercion | State: the notice accurately recites OCGA and informs of consequences; informing of sanctions is not unlawful coercion | Held: The notice was lawful and not coercive; informing of statutory consequences does not invalidate consent |
Key Cases Cited
- Barrett v. State, 289 Ga. 197 (discussing standard of review for motions to exclude chemical-test evidence)
- Williams v. State, 296 Ga. 817 (holding statutory implied-consent compliance does not automatically equal voluntary consent)
- Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (establishing totality-of-the-circumstances test for consent searches)
- Birchfield v. North Dakota, 579 U.S. 438 (addressing constitutionality of breath tests incident to arrest)