The State v. Osborne
330 Ga. App. 688
| Ga. Ct. App. | 2015Background
- Before arraignment in Paulding County Superior Court, the State filed a motion to recuse the assigned judge; the judge dismissed the motion as legally insufficient without referring it to another judge for a hearing.
- The State appealed to the Court of Appeals, but did not obtain a certificate of immediate review from the trial court nor permission for an interlocutory appeal from this Court as required by OCGA §§ 5-7-1 and 5-7-2.
- The State argued the Court of Appeals should nonetheless hear the matter under the collateral order doctrine because denying review would leave the State without any post-acquittal remedy and impair due process.
- The trial-court recusal motion alleged multiple incidents suggesting the judge may lack impartiality toward the District Attorney’s Office (e.g., prior recusal, ex parte suppression order, sarcastic remarks, refusal to hold hearings without a court reporter).
- The Court of Appeals concluded statutory interlocutory-appeal procedures apply and must be strictly followed; because the State failed to comply, the attempted appeal was dismissed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Court of Appeals has jurisdiction absent a certificate of immediate review when State appeals denial of its motion to recuse | State: collateral-order doctrine permits immediate review; otherwise State’s due process rights could be lost after acquittal | Court/Appellee: statutory interlocutory procedure (OCGA §§ 5-7-1, 5-7-2) controls; certificate requirement is mandatory | Held: No jurisdiction; appeal dismissed for failure to obtain certificate/permission under the statutes |
| Whether collateral order doctrine applies to allow review despite statutory appeal procedures not followed | State: collateral-order exception should apply to avoid rendering statutory rights meaningless and to preserve reviewability | Court: collateral-order doctrine not available where legislature has provided a specific statutory appeal route that was not followed | Held: Collateral-order doctrine not applied; statutes strictly govern State appeals in criminal cases |
| Whether circumstances here raised constitutional due-process grounds excusing statutory noncompliance | State: risk of losing review after acquittal implicates due process | Court: no showing that circumstances reached constitutional level to excuse statutory compliance | Held: No constitutional exception; compliance not excused |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Martin, 278 Ga. 418 (recognizes State appeal rights in criminal cases depend on statute and describes OCGA § 5-7-1/5-7-2 framework)
- State v. Ware, 282 Ga. 676 (statutes governing State appeals must be strictly construed; certificate of immediate review requirement discussed)
- Gable v. State, 290 Ga. 81 (statutory construction principles; context on appealability distinctions)
- Ritter v. State, 269 Ga. 884 (decision on recusal is interlocutory and cannot dispose of a criminal case)
- State v. Greenwood, 206 Ga. App. 188 (authority that State’s appellate rights in criminal cases are controlled by statute)
- Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (due process recusal standard; extreme facts may require disqualification)