The State v. Jacobs
342 Ga. App. 476
| Ga. Ct. App. | 2017Background
- At ~1:30 a.m., DeKalb officer stopped Kevin Jacobs for traffic violations, observed signs of intoxication (slurred speech, odor, open container), and placed him under arrest.
- Officer read Georgia’s implied-consent notice for drivers 21+ almost verbatim, including listing blood, breath, urine tests and consequences for refusal.
- Officer asked Jacobs to “designate which” test he would take rather than explicitly naming a particular test; Jacobs agreed to take a breath test.
- Jacobs moved to suppress the breath-test results, arguing consent was coerced/invalid because the officer failed to designate a specific test and framed the question as choosing among tests.
- Trial court granted suppression, finding the officer’s phrasing would lead a reasonable person to think they could not refuse testing; the State appealed.
- Court of Appeals reversed, holding consent was voluntary under the totality of circumstances despite the officer not specifying a single test.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Jacobs) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether consent to breath test was voluntary under totality of circumstances | Officer’s verbatim reading of implied-consent notice and Jacobs’s affirmative answer show voluntary consent | The officer’s failure to designate a specific test and his phrasing turned the question into a choice of test, causing confusion and coercion | Consent was voluntary; suppression reversed |
| Whether failure to designate a specific test in the warning invalidates consent | Listing available tests is sufficient; substantive accuracy of warning matters, not precise designation | Officer’s omission of a specific designation transformed the warning into a multiple-choice question and undermined voluntariness | Failure to designate did not change substance or meaning of warning; admissible |
| Whether the manner of asking (asking to “designate which one”) vitiated the right to refuse | The notice as a whole, including explicit consequences for refusal, made refusal an option and informed decision possible | The final phrasing could lead a reasonable person to believe refusal was not an option | Court weighed totality; phrasing alone did not negate voluntariness |
| Whether suppression is required absent threats, force, or other coercive factors | Without physical coercion, lengthy detention, impaired understanding, or other classic coercive factors, consent stands | Reliance on the single phrasing error was sufficient to show coerced acquiescence | No single factor controls; here other factors supported voluntariness, so suppression was improper |
Key Cases Cited
- Young v. State, 339 Ga. App. 306 (holding voluntariness of consent assessed under totality of circumstances; knowledge of right to refuse is one factor)
- Jones v. State, 319 Ga. App. 520 (officer’s failure to designate particular test did not invalidate consent where notice was substantively accurate)
- Nagata v. State, 319 Ga. App. 513 (same: listing tests available sufficed to permit informed decision)
- Collins v. State, 290 Ga. App. 418 (implied-consent warning accurate enough when officer listed tests and allowed defendant to choose)
- McKibben v. State, 340 Ga. App. 89 (affirming voluntariness where defendant affirmed consent, did not object, and officer used no coercion)
- Dean v. State, 250 Ga. 77 (describing factors relevant to voluntariness under totality-of-circumstances test)