339 Ga. App. 473
Ga. Ct. App.2016Background
- Late-night single-vehicle collision; officer found Clay in the vehicle smelling of alcohol, with slurred speech and glassy eyes; Clay admitted drinking and was unsteady when assisted into an ambulance.
- Officer conducted a reduced field sobriety evaluation (horizontal gaze nystagmus) and then a preliminary breath test, which led to Clay’s arrest.
- After arrest, officer read Georgia’s implied-consent warning for drivers over 21; Clay responded, “so you’re going to draw my blood, all right, I’ll submit.”
- EMS asked Clay for consent, he orally agreed and signed an electronic consent form; EMS drew blood without incident. No video recording exists of the encounter.
- Clay moved to suppress the state-administered blood-test results arguing his response was mere acquiescence rather than voluntary consent; the trial court granted suppression.
- The State appealed; the Court of Appeals reversed, holding the record shows voluntary consent under the totality of the circumstances.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Clay voluntarily consented to a warrantless blood draw under the Fourth Amendment | State: Clay verbally and in writing consented after receiving the implied-consent warning; no coercive conduct; consent exception applies | Clay: His statement “I’ll submit” was acquiescence prompted by implied-consent advisement and potential license consequences, not voluntary consent | Reversed trial court: consent was voluntary under the totality of circumstances; implied-consent warning and lack of coercion do not render consent involuntary |
| Whether an affirmative response to the implied-consent notice automatically equals Fourth Amendment consent | State: Affirmative response can be sufficient absent evidence of involuntariness | Clay: Williams requires searching totality; here response was compelled by statutory consequences | Court: Williams rejected a per se rule; but the State need not always prove additional conversation; an affirmative response may suffice if voluntary |
| Whether trial court could rely on hypothetical concerns about license suspension to find involuntariness | State: Court cannot speculate about a hypothetical suspect’s feelings; advisement of sanctions is not coercive by itself | Clay: Potential loss of driving privileges creates pressure and undermines voluntariness | Court: Trial court erred to base suppression on speculative concern; advisement of statutory consequences is not inherently coercive |
| Whether State was required to produce EMS consent form printout to prove consent | State: Officer testimony and EMS testimony established oral and written consent | Clay: Exclusion of the electronic printout undermines proof of consent | Court: No per se requirement for additional conversation or documents; officer testimony sufficed to show voluntariness |
Key Cases Cited
- Williams v. State, 296 Ga. 817 (Ga. 2015) (rejected per se rule equating implied-consent response with Fourth Amendment consent; totality-of-circumstances required)
- Kendrick v. State, 335 Ga. App. 766 (Ga. App. 2016) (discusses sufficiency of affirmative response to implied-consent notice absent signs of involuntariness)
- State v. Reid, 337 Ga. App. 77 (Ga. App. 2016) (reversed suppression where no evidence consent was coerced)
- State v. Domenge-Delhoyo, 338 Ga. App. 439 (Ga. App. 2016) (physical precedent addressing voluntariness of consent to blood draw)
- Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016) (Supreme Court: states cannot criminalize refusal of blood tests; approves civil/evidentiary consequences under implied-consent regimes)
- Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013) (Supreme Court: warrantless blood draws require consideration of exigent circumstances)