The State of Washington, Respondent, v. Dawn Marie Sullivan, Appellant
196 Wash. App. 277
| Wash. Ct. App. | 2016Background
- Dawn Sullivan was convicted of second-degree assault with a deadly weapon after cutting Christopher Bohannon during an altercation in his apartment; a third person (Robert Cessill) was present and accounts of who provoked the fight conflicted.
- Sullivan testified she acted in self-defense, claiming both men were on top of her and she feared further harm; Bohannon and Cessill testified Sullivan initiated violence and later took a kitchen knife and cut Bohannon.
- During trial a juror (Juror 9) reported he might recognize Bohannon; defense moved to excuse him for cause and the trial court denied the challenge.
- The court instructed the jury on self-defense and, over Sullivan’s objection, gave a first-aggressor instruction but refused a proposed multiple-assailants instruction; Sullivan also objects to a prosecutor remark in closing suggesting she implied fear of sexual assault (no contemporaneous objection was made).
- The trial court imposed an exceptional sentence of no jail time for the underlying assault but ordered Sullivan to serve the mandatory 12-month deadly-weapon enhancement in King County CCAP (community program); both sides appealed.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction on all trial issues but held the CCAP placement and credit for CCAP time toward the mandatory one-year deadly-weapon enhancement were improper under the Sentencing Reform Act and State v. Medina, and remanded for resentencing.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Sullivan) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Juror bias | Juror’s possible acquaintance with victim did not require excusal; juror said connection wouldn’t affect credibility | Juror’s possible prior acquaintance with Bohannon created risk to impartiality and should have been excused for cause | Trial court did not abuse discretion; juror’s assurances supported impartiality |
| First-aggressor instruction | Instruction proper because evidence supported that Sullivan provoked the fight or made the first aggressive moves | Instruction was legally incorrect or unsupported; it improperly limited self-defense | Given instruction matched controlling law and was supported by conflicting testimony; no error |
| Multiple-assailants instruction | Not necessary; existing self-defense instructions allowed jury to consider fear of multiple attackers | Failure to give instruction deprived Sullivan of ability to argue fear of multiple assailants | Refusal harmless/correct; proposed instruction would have been cumulative to instructions given |
| Prosecutor closing remark | Comment was a fair inference from Sullivan’s testimony about fear and prior unwanted sexual encounter | Remark improperly appealed to jurors’ passions and suggested facts outside the record | Remark was a reasonable inference from the record and not improper; no relief because Sullivan did not object at trial |
| Sentence placement of deadly-weapon enhancement | Trial court lacked statutory authority to allow CCAP to satisfy mandatory one-year total confinement enhancement | CCAP was more appropriate and beneficial than confinement; credit for CCAP time was equitable | Per the Sentencing Reform Act and State v. Medina, CCAP is not "total" or permissible substitute; CCAP placement and credit vacated; remand for resentencing |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Riley, 137 Wn.2d 904 (Wash. 1999) (standards for first-aggressor instruction and when provocation defeats self-defense)
- State v. Wingate, 155 Wn.2d 817 (Wash. 2005) (approved wording for aggressor instruction similar to the one given)
- State v. Medina, 180 Wn.2d 282 (Wash. 2014) (held CCAP participation does not qualify as partial or total confinement for mandatory enhancements)
- State v. Emery, 174 Wn.2d 741 (Wash. 2012) (standards for prosecutorial misconduct review and prejudice when no contemporaneous objection)