the State of Texas Ex Rel. Todd A. Durden, in His Official Capacity as County Attorney v. James T. "tully" Shahan, in His Official Capacity as County Judge Mark Frerich, in His Official Capacity as County Commissioner Joe Montalvo, in His Official Capacity as County Commissioner Dennis Dodson, in His Official Capacity as County Commissioner Tim Ward, in His Official Capacity as County Commissioner Kinney County Commissioners Court Kinney County And Rick Alvarado, in His Official Capacity as District and County Clerk of Kinney County, Texas, 658 S.W.3d 300

Background

Todd A. Durden, Kinney County Attorney, filed three separate suits purportedly on behalf of the State of Texas: two alleging Open Meetings Act and related violations tied to a salary reduction, and one seeking mandamus to recover deposited litigation costs.
Defendants moved for dismissal, summary judgment, and sanctions, arguing Durden lacked statutory authority to sue on the State’s behalf.
The trial court dismissed all three suits for lack of jurisdiction and awarded sanctions against Durden personally (attorney’s fees and costs).
Durden filed notices of appeal naming the "State of Texas" as appellant and himself only in his official capacity; none expressly invoked an individual-capacity appeal, though the notices sought review of "all issues and as to all parties affected."
The court of appeals affirmed dismissal for lack of authority and declined to consider Durden’s challenges to the personal sanctions because he had not perfected an individual-capacity appeal; it denied his requests to amend.
The Texas Supreme Court agreed Durden lacked authority to sue on the State’s behalf but held the court of appeals erred in refusing to treat Durden’s filings as a bona fide attempt to appeal the sanctions or to permit amendment; it reversed that portion and remanded for further proceedings.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Durden)	Defendant's Argument	Held
1) Whether a county attorney may sue on the State’s behalf under the Open Meetings Act (TOMA)	TOMA authorizes any "interested person" to sue; county attorney (as State rep) may bring these suits for the State	TOMA does not authorize a county attorney to institute suits in the State’s name; AG is the proper State actor	Durden lacked authority to sue on the State’s behalf under TOMA; court of appeals affirmed on this point
2) Whether Durden properly perfected an appeal of the sanctions imposed against him personally	Notices appealed "all issues" and briefs challenged sanctions; this constituted a timely, bona fide attempt to invoke appellate jurisdiction for the individual sanctions	Notices named only the State/official capacity; no separate individual notice was filed, so appeal of personal sanctions was defective	Court held Durden made a bona fide attempt; court of appeals should have accepted the deficient notice or allowed amendment; reversed as to sanctions issue and remanded
3) Whether an appellate court must permit amendment when a timely filing shows a bona fide attempt to appeal	Precedent requires courts to accept deficient notices or allow amendment to perfect appeals when a bona fide attempt exists	Strict procedural compliance required; failure to file individual notice deprives appeals court of jurisdiction over individual claims	Texas Supreme Court reaffirmed precedent (Mitschke, In re J.M., Verburgt): accept bona fide attempt and permit amendment; appellate court erred by denying amendment
4) Whether the Supreme Court would reach the merits of the sanctions (jurisdiction over person, notice, immunity, factual basis)	Durden argued lack of personal-jurisdiction, improper notice of intent to seek individual sanctions, absolute immunity, and lack of legal/factual basis for sanctions	Defendants defended the sanctions awards and urged affirmance	Court did not decide the merits of sanctions; remanded to court of appeals for further proceedings consistent with ruling on appellate jurisdiction

Key Cases Cited

Garcia v. Laughlin, 285 S.W.2d 191 (Tex. 1955) (Constitution permits Legislature to define duties/authority of state attorneys)
El Paso Elec. Co. v. Tex. Dep’t of Ins., 937 S.W.2d 432 (Tex. 1996) (statutory allocation of representation between AG and local prosecutors)
Ward County v. King, 454 S.W.2d 239 (El Paso Ct. App. 1970) (county attorney lacks authority to initiate certain civil suits absent statute)
Looscan v. Harris County, 58 Tex. 511 (Tex. 1883) (Legislature must provide authority for public officers to bring suits)
Mitschke v. Borromeo, 645 S.W.3d 251 (Tex. 2022) (timely filings showing bona fide attempt invoke appellate jurisdiction)
In re J.M., 396 S.W.3d 528 (Tex. 2013) (same — courts should decide appeals on merits when possible)
Verburgt v. Dorner, 959 S.W.2d 615 (Tex. 1997) (recognizing courts must liberally treat defective notices that show bona fide attempt)
Grand Prairie Indep. Sch. Dist. v. S. Parts Imports, Inc., 813 S.W.2d 499 (Tex. 1991) (appellate courts must accept deficient notices or permit amendment when timely and bona fide)