364 P.3d 213
Haw.2015Background
- D.R. Horton-Schuler petitioned the Hawai'i Land Use Commission (LUC) to reclassify ~1,525.5 acres (Ho'opili) from the State agricultural district to the urban district for a large mixed‑use residential/transit‑oriented development.
- The petition triggered extensive LUC hearings (2009–2012); parties included the State Office of Planning, City & County of Honolulu Department of Planning and Permitting (DPP), Sierra Club, and intervenor Clayton Hee.
- Key evidentiary themes: agricultural productivity of the site; availability of replacement farmland elsewhere on O'ahu; feasibility of intensive/hydroponic agriculture; and the project’s necessity for urban growth and consistency with the Hawai'i State Plan.
- LUC issued a lengthy Decision & Order approving reclassification with findings that the project was necessary for urban growth, would not substantially impair agricultural production, and conformed to the State Plan; DPP excluded the parcel from county IAL recommendations as within the Urban Growth Boundary.
- Appellants appealed to the circuit court claiming violations of Article XI, § 3 of the Hawai'i Constitution, Act 183 (Part III, HRS ch. 205), and HAR § 15‑15‑77; the circuit court affirmed the LUC and the Hawai'i Supreme Court granted review on transfer.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Article XI, § 3 requires the LUC to stay reclassification pending county IAL designation | Article XI, § 3’s protection of agricultural lands (and Part III objectives) requires the LUC to halt reclassification until counties complete IAL mapping | Article XI, § 3 is not self‑executing as to IAL protection; Save Sunset Beach and Act 183 show legislature implements standards and does not require a stay | Court: No stay required — Article XI, § 3 (standing alone) does not mandate a pause; Save Sunset Beach forecloses that argument and Act 183 contains no stay requirement |
| Whether Act 183 (Part III) bars reclassification before county IAL designation | Act 183’s IAL processes were intended to protect IALs; LUC should defer while counties identify IALs | Act 183 provides county‑initiated and owner‑initiated designation procedures but does not require reclassification to be stayed; parcels already designated or planned for urban use are excluded from IALs | Court: Act 183 does not require a stay; Petition lands lie inside the county Urban Growth Boundary and are excluded from IAL designation, so staying would not change outcome |
| Whether the LUC violated HAR § 15‑15‑77 (b)(6) — removal of intensive/high‑capacity ag land | Appellants: record shows replacement lands insufficient, water/infrastructure lacking, hydroponics infeasible, and reclassification is unnecessary for urban growth | Respondents: substantial evidence (experts, tenant statements, DOA testimony) shows replacement lands exist, infrastructure plans under way, and the project is reasonably necessary for urban growth | Court: LUC’s findings that reclassification was reasonably necessary for urban growth were unchallenged and binding; substantial, probative evidence supports conclusion that agricultural production is not substantially impaired; HAR § 15‑15‑77 satisfied |
| Whether the LUC complied with HRS § 205‑4(h) requirement to find reclassification not violative of Part III | Appellants: LUC must make a preponderance‑of‑evidence finding that the reclassification does not violate Part III and failed to do so | LUC: although COL omitted explicit Part III conclusion, numerous FOFs addressed IAL issues and county process; parcel excluded from IALs so Part III not violated in practice | Court (majority): LUC erred to omit an explicit Part III conclusion but error harmless under facts (parcel not IAL and county excluded it); dissent would vacate and remand for explicit Part III analysis |
Key Cases Cited
- Save Sunset Beach Coalition v. City & County of Honolulu, [citation="102 Hawai'i 465, 78 P.3d 1"] (Haw. 2003) (Article XI, § 3 is not self‑executing as to the two‑thirds requirement and requires implementing legislation)
- Ka Paʻakai O KaʻAina v. Land Use Comm'n, [citation="94 Hawai'i 31, 7 P.3d 1068"] (Haw. 2000) (agencies must make specific findings when constitutional protections require agency consideration)
- In re Water Use Permit Applications, [citation="94 Hawai'i 97, 9 P.3d 409"] (Haw. 2000) (definition of substantial evidence standard)
- Dep’t of Env. Servs. v. Land Use Comm’n, [citation="127 Hawai'i 5, 276 P.3d 809"] (Haw. 2012) (standard of appellate review for agency decisions)
- Bremer v. Weeks, [citation="104 Hawai'i 43, 85 P.3d 150"] (Haw. 2004) (unchallenged agency findings of fact are binding on appeal)