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203 A.3d 494
R.I.
2019
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Background

  • Feeley & Driscoll (an accounting/auditing firm) issued audited financial statements for Capco for 2009 (the 2009 Audit Report). IRBA later received that report.
  • Webster Bank made a $20M revolving credit facility to Capco and purchased $6M of bonds; IRBA insured up to $5M of those bonds. Capco was contractually required to provide annual audited financials during the term of the credit/bond arrangements.
  • After the 2009 report was issued, Capco requested a short-term increase (first credit increase) to its credit line; IRBA consented and says it relied on the 2009 Audit Report in so consenting. Feeley disputes negligence and whether IRBA relied on the report for that transaction.
  • IRBA sued Feeley for negligence after Capco defaulted on bonds; Feeley moved for summary judgment arguing it owed no duty to IRBA under the applicable legal standard for third-party accountant liability.
  • The Superior Court granted summary judgment for Feeley applying the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552 test; Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed, holding Feeley owed no duty to IRBA as a matter of law.

Issues

Issue Plaintiff's Argument Defendant's Argument Held
What rule governs accountant liability to third parties? Bowen allows third-party suits; adopt a rule that permits recovery here. Restatement §552 is the appropriate middle ground. Court adopted the Restatement (Second) Torts §552 approach.
Did Feeley owe a duty because it intended the 2009 report be used during the term of the transaction? Feeley knew audited statements would be used by Webster/IRBA during the credit/bond term, so liability follows. That assertion effectively advances a foreseeability standard; Restatement focuses on intent/knowledge at time of report. Rejects plaintiff; foreseeability alone is insufficient under §552—no duty on that basis.
Was the first credit increase "substantially similar" to the original transactions (so liability attaches)? The parties and general transaction type were the same; amount change was minor and IRBA's exposure remained $5M. The increase materially changed the credit terms (17.5% increase, different risks) and was not what the auditor reasonably perceived when issuing the report. Held not substantially similar; no duty under §552.
Did Feeley "authorize" Capco's use of the 2009 report (creating duty)? Feeley reviewed Capco’s credit request pre-submission and contract language required prepublication review, implying authorization. Minimal inclusion of audit data and absence of affirmative consent or active participation do not amount to authorization. Held no authorization shown; mere failure to object is insufficient to create §552 duty.

Key Cases Cited

  • Bowen Court Assocs. v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 818 A.2d 721 (R.I. 2003) (Rhode Island precedent on third-party accountant claims and setting stage for selecting a governing test)
  • Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931) (origin of near-privity limitation on accountant liability)
  • Nycal Corp. v. KPMG Peat Marwick LLP, 688 N.E.2d 1368 (Mass. 1998) (criticizing overly narrow near-privity rule and discussing Restatement balance)
  • North Am. Specialty Ins. Co. v. Lapalme, 258 F.3d 35 (1st Cir. 2001) (articulating two-step substantial-similarity analysis under §552)
  • Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745 (Cal. 1992) (endorsing Restatement §552 as sensible middle ground)
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Case Details

Case Name: The Rhode Island Industrial-Recreational Building Authority v. Capco Endurance, LLC
Court Name: Supreme Court of Rhode Island
Date Published: Mar 26, 2019
Citations: 203 A.3d 494; 2017-229-Appeal. (PB 13-2069)
Docket Number: 2017-229-Appeal. (PB 13-2069)
Court Abbreviation: R.I.
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    The Rhode Island Industrial-Recreational Building Authority v. Capco Endurance, LLC, 203 A.3d 494