The Ray Charles Foundation v. Raenee Robinson
795 F.3d 1109
9th Cir.2015Background
- Ray Charles assigned copyrights to publishers in the 1950s and renegotiated grants in 1980; he later left all rights and royalty streams to The Ray Charles Foundation by will.
- Seven of Charles’s twelve adult children (the Terminating Heirs) served 39 termination notices under 17 U.S.C. §§ 203 and 304(c) in March 2010, covering 51 compositions; notices were recorded by the Copyright Office in Jan. 2012 and had staggered effective dates beginning April 1, 2012.
- The Foundation sued in March 2012 seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to invalidate or clarify the termination notices and to protect its royalty stream; state-law contract claims were dismissed under California’s anti‑SLAPP statute and are not appealed.
- The district court dismissed the federal claim for lack of prudential standing (third‑party and zone‑of‑interests rationale), concluding the Foundation was not the proper party to challenge termination notices and denying leave to amend.
- On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held the Foundation had Article III standing and ripeness, rejected the Foundation’s “beneficial owner” argument as a route to standing for termination claims, and ruled the Foundation was asserting its own interests (not third‑party rights).
- The Ninth Circuit concluded an implied private cause of action exists to challenge termination notices, and the Foundation’s interest in continued royalties falls within the termination statutes’ zone of interests; the court reversed and remanded.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Foundation has Article III standing and ripeness to challenge termination notices | Foundation: relies on royalties; notices threaten concrete loss of income; relief would redress injury | Heirs: challenged prudential standing, not Article III; argued Foundation really asserts others’ (publisher’s) rights | Held: Article III standing and ripeness satisfied (concrete injury, causal link, redressability) |
| Whether Foundation may sue as a “beneficial owner” under Copyright Act | Foundation: as sole beneficiary and royalty recipient, it is a beneficial owner with standing analogous to infringement suits | Heirs: beneficial‑owner concept belongs to infringement context (§501) and doesn’t confer termination‑notice standing | Held: Beneficial‑owner argument not persuasive for termination claims; rejected as basis for standing |
| Whether Foundation is barred by third‑party (prudential) standing because it asserts publisher’s interests | Foundation: asserts its own economic interest in royalties and is directly affected | Heirs: Foundation is really litigating Warner/Chappell’s rights and lacks close relation/permission to sue | Held: Foundation asserts its own legal rights (royalty stream) and is not precluded by third‑party standing doctrine |
| Whether Foundation’s claims fall within the zone of interests of §§203 and 304(c) (i.e., whether it may bring termination‑related causes of action) | Foundation: termination statutes affect who receives royalties; its injury is precisely the interest statutes regulate | Heirs: statutes aim to benefit authors/heirs and enhance bargaining power; Foundation is neither grantee nor heir so outside zone | Held: Implied private causes of action exist; Foundation’s interest in royalty receipt is within the statutes’ zone of interests; proximate causation satisfied; reversed and remanded |
Key Cases Cited
- Warren v. Fox Family Worldwide, Inc., 328 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 2003) (standard for standing at motion‑to‑dismiss stage)
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (U.S. 1992) (constitutional standing requirements)
- Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377 (U.S. 2014) (zone‑of‑interests as statutory‑interpretation inquiry and proximate‑cause discussion)
- Milne ex rel. Coyne v. Stephen Slesinger, Inc., 430 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 2005) (termination provisions’ purposes and precedents allowing challenges)
- Larry Spier, Inc. v. Bourne Co., 953 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1992) (recognizing publisher’s and royalty‑recipient interests in termination disputes)