26 N.Y.3d 529
N.Y.2015Background
- Defendant (Honduran national with TPS) pleaded guilty to second-degree assault on March 19, 2009 and was sentenced May 14, 2009 to five years’ probation; he was advised of his right to appeal but filed no notice of appeal.
- After his felony conviction, Defendant faced removal and filed a CPL 440.10 motion in April 2011 to vacate the 2009 judgment based primarily on Padilla v. Kentucky (ineffective assistance for failing to advise about deportation consequences).
- Supreme Court denied the CPL 440.10 motion as untimely under the rule that Padilla is not retroactive to convictions final before March 31, 2010.
- Appellate Division granted leave to appeal and held the judgment did not become final until June 14, 2010 (one year plus 30 days after sentencing), reasoning CPL 460.30(1) (one-year grace to seek leave to file a late notice of appeal) extended finality. The court remitted for an evidentiary hearing.
- This Court granted the People leave to appeal and reversed, holding that where no timely direct appeal is taken and no CPL 460.30(1) motion is made, the judgment becomes final 30 days after sentencing under CPL 460.10(1)(a).
Issues
| Issue | Defendant's Argument | People's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| When does a judgment become final for applying a new federal constitutional rule when the defendant did not take a direct appeal? | Finality should be measured by the last date the defendant could have sought leave to file a late notice of appeal — i.e., 30 days plus the CPL 460.30(1) one-year grace (so June 14, 2010). | Finality occurs when the defendant’s automatic right to appeal expires — i.e., 30 days after sentencing under CPL 460.10(1)(a); CPL 460.30(1) does not extend finality absent a motion for leave. | Judgment is final 30 days after sentencing when no direct appeal is taken and no CPL 460.30(1) motion is made. |
| Whether Padilla retroactivity could save Defendant’s CPL 440.10 motion (state retroactivity broader than federal)? | Argued Padilla should apply retroactively because judgment was not final until after Padilla under CPL 460.30(1). | Relied on federal retroactivity jurisprudence (Chaidez/Teague) and state precedent rejecting broader retroactivity. | Padilla retroactivity was not available because the judgment became final before Padilla; Court did not expand Padilla retroactivity. |
Key Cases Cited
- Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (Sup. Ct. 2010) (Sixth Amendment requires advising noncitizen clients about deportation risk of guilty plea)
- Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103 (Sup. Ct. 2013) (Padilla announced a new rule not applied retroactively under Teague)
- Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (Sup. Ct. 1989) (framework for retroactivity of new constitutional rules on collateral review)
- Bethea v. Girdich, 293 F.3d 577 (2d Cir. 2002) (motion to extend time to appeal does not restart or extend federal habeas AEDPA limitations period; finality occurs when right to appeal expires)
- People v. Baret, 23 N.Y.3d 777 (N.Y. 2014) (state court declined to apply Padilla more broadly than Chaidez; discussed retroactivity)
- People v. Syville, 15 N.Y.3d 391 (N.Y. 2010) (discussion of writ of error coram nobis as post‑finality avenue to obtain leave to appeal)