523 P.3d 427
Colo.2022Background
- Defendant Jorge Solis is charged with first-degree murder, attempted first-degree arson, and first-degree trespass, prosecuted by the Seventh Judicial District (Gunnison office).
- Darren Struble, formerly a public defender who represented Solis for about a year, accepted employment with the DA's Gunnison office and therefore was personally disqualified from prosecuting Solis.
- The DA adopted a written screening policy restricting employees from participating in matters involving their former clients and took additional, case-specific precautions (e.g., blocked e-filing access; dedicated conference room) for Solis's file.
- Solis moved to disqualify the entire DA's Office and appoint a special prosecutor, arguing Struble’s prior representation and later lapses created “special circumstances” under § 20-1-107(2).
- The trial court initially denied the motion (crediting the screening measures) but, after learning Struble appeared for the DA in unrelated proceedings involving another former client and after an earlier procedural lapse, granted reconsideration and disqualified the entire DA’s Office.
- The People appealed; the Colorado Supreme Court reversed the disqualification, holding the trial court abused its discretion because the record lacked evidence that confidential information had been or could not be adequately screened in Solis’s case. Justice Gabriel dissented.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (People) | Defendant's Argument (Solis) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Struble's prior representation of Solis (and subsequent lapses) constituted "special circumstances" under § 20‑1‑107(2) requiring disqualification of the entire DA's Office | Disqualification was improper; the DA had a screening policy and case-specific safeguards that could prevent misuse of confidences | Struble acquired confidential information and subsequent violations of the screening policy show the office cannot ensure a fair trial, so the entire office must be disqualified | Reversed: no special circumstances shown as to this case; record contains no evidence confidential information was or would be disclosed and hypothetical future lapses are insufficient to disqualify the entire office |
| Whether a trial court may rely on potential or hypothetical future violations to disqualify an entire DA's office | People: a mere potential or hypothetical violation is not enough — defendant must point to actual facts/evidence | Solis: prior lapses plus small, integrated office and seriousness of charges justify disqualification to protect trial fairness | Held for People: courts require actual facts/evidence in the record showing a fair trial is unlikely; speculation about future violations cannot substitute for such evidence |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Kent, 476 P.3d 762 (Colo. 2020) (defendant must show actual facts in the record that demonstrate special circumstances making a fair trial unlikely)
- People v. Chavez, 139 P.3d 649 (Colo. 2006) (screening policies are relevant to imputing a conflict to an entire DA office; if adequate, disqualification is unnecessary)
- People v. Perez, 201 P.3d 1220 (Colo. 2009) (statutory grounds enumerated in § 20‑1‑107 are the exclusive bases for disqualification)
- People v. Loper, 241 P.3d 543 (Colo. 2010) (defendant bears burden to present facts supporting conclusion that a fair trial is unlikely)
- People v. Garcia, 698 P.2d 801 (Colo. 1985) (relevant factors include size and degree of integration of the DA staff in evaluating risk of misuse of confidences)
- People v. Arellano, 476 P.3d 364 (Colo. 2020) (district courts have broad discretion to disqualify an office; review is for abuse of discretion)