The People of the State of Colorado v. Alfred Elias Moreno, 506 P.3d 849

Alfred Moreno repeatedly emailed and posted vulgar, disparaging messages about his ex-wife after she told him to stop; he asked to see his children and posted a derogatory Facebook message.
Moreno was charged with harassment under § 18-9-111(1)(e) and with habitual domestic violence (sentence enhancer).
Moreno moved to dismiss, arguing subsection (1)(e)’s phrase "intended to harass" is facially overbroad and vague under the U.S. and Colorado constitutions.
The district court dismissed the harassment charge, finding "intended to harass" unconstitutionally vague and overbroad; the People appealed directly to the Colorado Supreme Court.
The Colorado Supreme Court applied the three-step overbreadth test, concluding the phrase "intended to harass" sweeps substantially into protected speech (including many electronic communications) and cannot be narrowly construed.
The Court severed the words "harass or" from subsection (1)(e), preserved the statute’s prohibitions on threats and obscenity, and affirmed dismissal of Moreno’s harassment charge.

Issue	People (Plaintiff) Argument	Moreno (Defendant) Argument	Held
Whether the phrase "intended to harass" in § 18-9-111(1)(e) is facially overbroad	Statute targets harassing communications (including threats/obscenity); it is a lawful regulation of abusive conduct	Phrase is vague and overbroad; it criminalizes protected speech (e.g., political speech, warnings, criticism)	Phrase is substantially overbroad on its face and unconstitutional; words "harass or" excised
Standing to bring facial overbreadth challenge	Moreno lacks standing because his own conduct fits the statute	A defendant may challenge an overbroad speech-regulating statute to protect others’ First Amendment rights	Court permits the facial overbreadth challenge; standing exists for speech statutes
Whether a limiting construction can salvage subsection (1)(e)	The statute can be interpreted narrowly to avoid constitutional problems	No plausible limiting construction sufficiently narrows "intended to harass"	No viable limiting construction exists; severance required
Whether privacy/safety interests justify the provision	Privacy and safety interests support restricting intrusive electronic harassment	Overbreadth chills protected speech; blocking/deleting reduces intrusion	Court rejects privacy argument as insufficient to cure overbreadth; technological remedies lessen intrusion

People v. Hickman, 988 P.2d 628 (Colo. 1999) (analyzes "harassment" definition and overbreadth concerns)
People v. Smith, 862 P.2d 939 (Colo. 1993) (framework for free-speech limits and statutory interpretation)
Bolles v. People, 541 P.2d 80 (Colo. 1975) (invalidated an earlier, broadly worded harassment provision as overbroad)
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (U.S. 1973) (overbreadth doctrine: facial invalidation standards)
Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass'n, 564 U.S. 786 (U.S. 2011) (First Amendment principles apply across new communication media)