2023 COA 49
Colo. Ct. App.2023Background
- Defendant Zachary Babcock pleaded guilty under a deferred judgment for child abuse; the court reserved restitution for the 91 days after acceptance of the plea.
- Prosecutor filed a motion for restitution (about $12,258.83 in medical bills) 82 days after plea; defense counsel, on day 90, requested a restitution hearing be set in June (outside the 91-day period).
- Trial court set the hearing for June; COVID-19 delays pushed the hearing to August 14, 2020, when the court ordered $12,258.83 in restitution.
- Babcock appealed, arguing the court lacked authority to impose restitution after 91 days without an express good-cause finding (relying on People v. Weeks).
- The People argued the 91-day deadline is nonjurisdictional and that Babcock waived any timeliness challenge by requesting a hearing beyond the 91-day period.
- The Court of Appeals held the 91-day deadline is nonjurisdictional, that Babcock waived the timeliness challenge, and that the evidence supported both causation and the restitution amount; it affirmed the restitution order.
Issues
| Issue | People’s Argument | Babcock’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Timeliness / Authority to impose restitution after 91 days | The 91‑day deadline is nonjurisdictional; Weeks addressed authority, not jurisdiction; deadline can be waived | Court lacked authority to award restitution after 91 days unless court made an express good‑cause finding within the period | Deadline is nonjurisdictional; Weeks did not convert the deadline into a jurisdictional bar |
| Waiver by requesting a hearing outside 91 days | Defense counsel requested a hearing beyond the 91 days before the deadline expired, so Babcock intentionally relinquished the right to timely determination | Requesting a later hearing does not waive the right to timely restitution or the right to an express good‑cause finding | Waiver applies: counsel’s request knowingly relinquished the statutory timing right; good‑cause finding is a statutory procedure for the court, not a defendant’s personal right |
| Proximate cause for victim’s injuries | Medical testimony and the timing of symptoms supported that defendant’s conduct proximately caused I.B.’s injuries | Evidence insufficient to prove defendant proximately caused the injuries | Sufficient evidence by a preponderance supported the court’s finding of proximate cause |
| Amount of restitution ($12,258.83) | Medical bills and submitted documentary evidence proved the amount; rules of evidence are relaxed at restitution hearings | Amount not proven; prosecutor misspoke on a year; should have produced live witnesses | Amount was proven by documentary evidence; defendant either conceded/waived challenge or failed to object |
Key Cases Cited
- Minto v. Lambert, 870 P.2d 572 (Colo. App. 1993) (distinguishes subject‑matter jurisdiction from authority to enter a particular judgment)
- Wood v. People, 255 P.3d 1136 (Colo. 2011) (jurisdictional limits must be explicit; nonjurisdictional defects can be waived)
- People v. McMurtry, 122 P.3d 237 (Colo. 2005) (statutory timing rights are not necessarily jurisdictional)
- Dolan v. United States, 560 U.S. 605 (U.S. 2010) (error of law as authority versus jurisdictional defect)
- People v. Rivera, 250 P.3d 1272 (Colo. App. 2010) (defines proximate cause in restitution context)