the Office of the Attorney General of Texas v. C.W.H.
531 S.W.3d 178
| Tex. | 2017Background
- In 2010 a district court named Father sole managing conservator and Mother a possessory conservator and ordered Mother to pay child support to Father.
- Father later left the children with maternal grandparents; grandparents filed an unused motion to modify conservatorship in 2011.
- In 2014 the Office of the Attorney General (OAG) filed a notice and motion asserting the children lived with Mother and asking the court to modify conservatorship and child-support orders; the case was referred to a Title IV‑D associate judge under existing regional orders.
- Father, incarcerated at the time, filed a pro se answer requesting appointed counsel, a bench warrant to attend, or permission to participate remotely from prison; he did not appear at the associate judge’s November 25, 2014 hearing.
- The associate judge appointed Mother and Grandparents as joint managing conservators, denied Father’s bench-warrant request, ordered no contact between Father and the children, and altered support provisions; Father later appealed.
- The court of appeals reversed and remanded on two independent grounds: (1) Title IV‑D associate judges lacked authority to modify conservatorship under the prior Code; and (2) the associate judge erred by failing to consider Father’s request to participate remotely. The OAG conceded the second ground.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether this became a Title IV‑D case when OAG filed to modify support and conservatorship | OAG: filing for modification of child support made it a Title IV‑D case | Father: OAG cannot convert a private suit into a Title IV‑D case by intervening | Held: Yes — the OAG’s motion to modify child support made it a Title IV‑D case under Fam. Code §101.034 (prior version) |
| Whether the OAG had authority to seek modification of conservatorship | OAG: federal Title IV‑D authorizes services related to establishing/modifying support including related conservatorship changes | Father: Texas statutes did not expressly authorize OAG to change conservatorship | Held: OAG had authority because federal law contemplates services related to establishing or modifying support and Fam. Code §231.101 incorporates those services |
| Whether Title IV‑D associate judges had authority to decide conservatorship issues in such cases | OAG: subchapter B granted associate judges power to render/recommend any order needed to complete a Title IV‑D case, including conservatorship related to support | Father: §201.104(e) lists specific matters and does not expressly include conservatorship, so associate judges lacked authority | Held: Associate judges had authority under §201.104(b),(c) and (e)(4) to render/recommend orders on conservatorship when related to establishment/modification of child support |
| Whether the associate judge’s order should stand despite alleged procedural error (Father’s request to participate remotely) | OAG: conceded error in not considering Father’s remote participation request and agreed reversal is appropriate on that basis | Father: sought reversal on that ground among others | Held: Court affirmed the court of appeals’ reversal and remand solely because the associate judge failed to consider Father’s request to participate remotely from prison |
Key Cases Cited
- Thomas v. Oldham, 895 S.W.2d 352 (Tex. 1995) (defining “action” as an entire lawsuit or proceeding)
- Jaster v. Comet II Const., Inc., 438 S.W.3d 556 (Tex. 2014) (statutory construction on ordinary meaning of terms)
- Perry v. Del Rio, 67 S.W.3d 85 (Tex. 2001) (agency authority limited to constitutional and statutory bounds)