the Office of the Attorney General of Texas v. Richard Lynn Scholer
403 S.W.3d 859
| Tex. | 2013Background
- 1993 California divorce; Wilbourn awarded sole custody and Scholer ordered to pay $450 monthly child support.
- Scholer and Wilbourn verbally reduced payments to $300 in 1994; Scholer continued payments through 1999.
- Scholer and Wilbourn relocated to Texas; Scholer later attempted to terminate parental rights after a 2000 attorney-drafted affidavit.
- Scholer signed a September 2000 affidavit relinquishing rights; the affidavit was never filed, and Wilbourn neither informed nor pursued termination.
- Scholer stopped paying support under the belief rights were terminated; in 2009 the OAG informed him of arrears and sought enforcement.
- Trial court denied estoppel; appellate court reversed, prompting Supreme Court review to address estoppel as a defense in child support enforcement.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether estoppel is an affirmative defense in child support enforcement actions under Texas law. | Scholer argues estoppel bars OAG enforcement due to reliance on assurances of termination. | OAG contends estoppel is not a statutory defense and courts cannot exercise discretionary relief in arrears actions. | Estoppel is not an affirmative defense in child support enforcement; limited defenses exist under statute. |
| Whether the OAG, as assignee, may rely on estoppel in pursuing arrears. | Scholer asserts the OAG's assignee status allows estoppel defenses. | OAG argues statutory scheme limits defenses and forecloses estoppel. | Statutory scheme restricts defenses; estoppel cannot be used to defeat enforcement. |
| Whether post-1995 statutory amendments foreclose estoppel defenses in arrearage actions. | Scholer relies on appellate precedents recognizing estoppel pre-amendments. | OAG notes amendments limit defenses and require arrearage calculations per statute. | Legislative amendments preclude estoppel as a defense; arrears must be calculated under the statute. |
| What is the nature of child support obligation and its enforcement mechanics in Texas? | Duty to pay child support arises from statute, not a debt to the other parent. | Enforcement should apply statutory defaults without discretionary relief. | Child support is a duty to the child; enforcement framed by statute, not personal debt. |
Key Cases Cited
- LaRue v. LaRue, 832 S.W.2d 387 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1992) (estoppel recognized in appropriate circumstances to avoid injustice)
- Kawazoe v. Davila, 849 S.W.2d 906 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1993) (estoppel defense in child support context before amendments)
- Hall v. Hall, 854 S.W.2d 656 (Tex. 1993) (child support estoppel-related concepts in Texas precedent)
- In re A.L.G., 229 S.W.3d 783 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2007) (estoppel/quasi-estoppel discussed as defense in context)
- In re Moragas, 972 S.W.2d 86 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1998) (illustrative estoppel considerations in child support cases)
- Gawlik v. Gawlik, 707 S.W.2d 256 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1986) (early estoppel considerations in support actions)
- Williams v. Patton, 821 S.W.2d 141 (Tex. 1991) (policy favoring child welfare in support obligations)
