The Metropolitan Water Dist. of S. Cal. v. Collins CA2/3
B305990
| Cal. Ct. App. | Mar 23, 2022Background:
- Metro fired longtime operator Timothy Leuschner for fighting, violating a no‑smoking/e‑cigarette rule, and insubordination after a March 2017 control‑room altercation with acting operator Daryl Norman.
- AFSCME appealed under the parties’ MOU to a neutral hearing officer; the parties stipulated the officer should decide whether Metro had just cause to discharge Leuschner and, if not, the proper remedy.
- At the hearing the officer found Norman lunged and headbutted Leuschner and that Leuschner acted in self‑defense; the officer also found Leuschner lacked notice of the e‑cigarette policy and reasonably doubted Norman’s supervisory status.
- The officer revoked the termination and ordered a three‑week suspension (rather than simple reinstatement).
- Metro sought mandamus in superior court arguing (1) the officer exceeded MOU authority by imposing a suspension, (2) critical findings lacked substantial evidence, and (3) the officer ignored relevant Skelly factors; the superior court remanded for reconsideration of one factual finding but acknowledged the officer’s remedial authority via stipulation.
- The Court of Appeal affirmed: it reviewed the hearing officer’s decision under the substantial‑evidence standard and rejected Metro’s arguments that the officer abused discretion, failed to consider factors/evidence, or exceeded authority.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether hearing officer abused discretion by ignoring Skelly factors | Officer disregarded harm-to-public‑service and seriousness of misconduct; termination was justified | Officer considered Skelly factors, credited mitigating evidence (self‑defense, lack of notice, doubt about acting manager) | No abuse: substantial evidence supports officer’s findings and remedy; reasonable minds could differ |
| Whether officer had authority to impose a suspension | MOU §6.7.6(B) permits only sustain or revoke, not substitute discipline | Parties’ stipulation submitted “If not, what shall be the remedy?” broadens officer’s authority | Officer properly imposed suspension under the parties’ stipulation; Valencia/Winograd not controlling here |
| Sufficiency of evidence that Norman initiated the fight | Record lacks support that Norman approached within 18 inches; initiation finding unsupported | Evidence supports that Norman lunged and headbutted; witness credibility favored Leuschner | Court upheld officer’s factual credibility determinations; substantial evidence supports core finding that Norman initiated the assault |
| Whether officer ignored/failed to consider other evidence (vaping notice, insubordination, dishonesty, injuries, disparate treatment) | Officer improperly ignored evidence of wrongdoing, injuries, dishonesty, and Metro’s safety concerns | Many arguments forfeited below; officer considered record, declined to treat dishonesty as an unpleaded basis, and permissibly considered disparate treatment | No error: forfeiture and/or substantial evidence support the officer’s conclusions; declining to treat unpleaded dishonesty as separate ground was proper |
Key Cases Cited
- Skelly v. State Personnel Bd., 15 Cal.3d 194 (1975) (establishes factors—harm to public service and likelihood of recurrence—for reviewing public‑employee discipline)
- Pedro v. City of Los Angeles, 229 Cal.App.4th 87 (2014) (standard: view evidence in light most favorable to administrative decision on substantial‑evidence review)
- Cranston v. City of Richmond, 40 Cal.3d 755 (1985) (just‑cause standard requires notice of proscribed conduct for discipline leading to discharge)
- Valencia v. County of Sonoma, 158 Cal.App.4th 644 (2007) (limits on administrative bodies imposing remedies beyond MOU where not authorized)
- Metropolitan Water Dist. v. Winograd, 24 Cal.App.5th 881 (2018) (hearing officer exceeded authority by deciding an issue beyond the parties’ submission and the MOU)