The Metropolitan Government of Nashville And Davidson County v. RSF Investors, LLC
M2016-02221-COA-R3-CV
| Tenn. Ct. App. | Jul 14, 2017Background
- RSF Investors owns a restaurant in the Broadway Historic Preservation District in Nashville; it constructed a second‑story canopy/addition in 2010 and applied for a preservation permit after beginning work.
- At the July 2010 Commission hearing, the Commission approved RSF’s architectural plans but expressly denied permission to enclose the canopy with drop‑down panels and the issued permit stated: “The canopy and/or the openings shall not be enclosed without review and permit from the [Commission].”
- RSF installed clear plastic panels (contrary to the permit), removed them after Commission objection, then later reinstalled drop‑down panels and ultimately replaced them with interior clear glass panels mounted on tracks a few inches inside the canopy frame.
- Metro filed suit and obtained a General Sessions injunction; RSF appealed to circuit court. After motions and multiple post‑judgment filings/orders, the circuit court granted Metro summary judgment, ordered removal of the glass panels, and permanently enjoined reinstallation without Commission approval.
- RSF appealed, arguing (1) Commission lacked jurisdiction over interior panels, (2) the one‑year permit had expired before the enclosures were installed, and (3) factual disputes made summary judgment inappropriate. Metro argued the appeal was untimely. The Court of Appeals found the appeal timely and affirmed summary judgment for Metro.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Metro) | Defendant's Argument (RSF) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Timeliness of appeal | Metro argued RSF’s successive post‑judgment motions did not extend appeal time; appeal should be dismissed as untimely | RSF argued the sequence of orders and post‑judgment motions tolled the appeal deadline and its notice was timely | Court held the appeal was timely: Metro’s post‑judgment filing functioned as a Rule 59.04 motion and the September 29 order was final; jurisdiction existed for the appeal |
| Commission jurisdiction over panels | Commission/Metro argued the Guidelines cover exterior and interior changes that affect exterior appearance; panels were visible from public rights‑of‑way so Commission had authority | RSF argued the panels were interior, not affixed to exterior, and therefore outside the Commission’s jurisdiction | Court held the Commission had jurisdiction because the Guidelines cover interior changes that affect exterior upper facades and the panels altered exterior appearance and were visible from public ways |
| Enforceability of the 12‑month permit | Metro argued the permit remains valid if construction commenced/completed within 12 months; Commission inspected and approved work within that period so permit did not lapse | RSF argued the permit expired 12 months after issuance and could not be enforced against later installations | Court held the permit did not expire because RSF commenced and completed the permitted work within 12 months and the Commission inspected/approved the work within that period |
| Whether glass panels constituted an "enclosure" violating the permit | Metro argued the panels—though interior—visually enclosed the canopy/openings, violating the permit’s prohibition on enclosing without review | RSF relied on construction/Code definitions and witness testimony that panels were interior and not a structural enclosure | Court held no genuine issue of material fact: photographic record and permit language showed the panels functionally enclosed the openings; summary judgment for Metro affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- In re Estate of Henderson, 121 S.W.3d 643 (Tenn. 2003) (defining final judgment as one resolving all claims between parties)
- Albert v. Frye, 145 S.W.3d 526 (Tenn. 2004) (post‑judgment motions toll the appeal deadline; limitations on serial motions)
- Bemis Co. Inc. v. Hines, 585 S.W.2d 574 (Tenn. 1979) (substance of a motion controls its character for appeal‑deadline purposes)
- Turner v. Bell, 279 S.W.2d 71 (Tenn. 1955) (distinguishing collateral vs. direct attacks on judgments)
- State ex rel. Ragsdale v. Sandefur, 389 S.W.2d 266 (Tenn. 1965) (administrative determinations not subject to collateral attack if made within jurisdiction)
- Andrews v. Fifth Third Bank, 228 S.W.3d 102 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007) (res judicata bars collateral attack on administrative decisions)
- Lovlace v. Copley, 418 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. 2013) (jurisdictional defects render administrative decisions void and subject to collateral attack)
- Rye v. Women’s Care Ctr. of Memphis, MPLLC, 477 S.W.3d 235 (Tenn. 2015) (standards and de novo review on summary judgment)
- Byrd v. Hall, 847 S.W.2d 208 (Tenn. 1993) (definition of material fact for summary judgment analysis)
- Jackson v. Smith, 387 S.W.3d 486 (Tenn. 2012) (res judicata and finality promote litigation finality)
