The Metropolitan Government of Nashville And Davidson County v. Delinquent Taxpayers As Shown On The 2006 Real Property Tax Records
M2016-02220-COA-R3-CV
| Tenn. Ct. App. | Jun 23, 2017Background
- Metro sued in chancery court to collect 2006 delinquent taxes on property owned by Lucien Worsham; the property was sold at a delinquent tax sale on December 10, 2008, and a final decree confirming the sale to Davidson Pabts, LLC (Pabts) was entered March 13, 2009 and recorded April 9, 2009.
- Worsham never paid the taxes and did not receive the proceeds/title; he later claimed he had inadequate notice and the sale was void for lack of personal jurisdiction.
- In October 2013 Pabts filed a quiet title action against Worsham; the trial court and this Court rejected Worsham’s due-process/notice challenge and quieted title in Pabts’s favor; the Tennessee Supreme Court denied review.
- Six years after the 2009 confirmation decree, Worsham filed a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02(3) motion to set aside the 2009 final decree as void for lack of personal jurisdiction due to allegedly inadequate notice.
- The chancery court denied the Rule 60.02(3) motion on res judicata grounds (claim preclusion), concluding Worsham’s dispute was with Pabts and had already been resolved.
- On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the denial but held the correct basis was collateral estoppel (issue preclusion): Worsham had already litigated and lost the identical notice/due-process issue in the quiet title action.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the 2009 decree confirming the tax sale is void for lack of personal jurisdiction because of constitutionally inadequate notice | Worsham: Metro did not give constitutionally adequate notice (failed to notify his home address), so the decree is void ab initio | Metro: Worsham already litigated and lost the identical notice issue in the quiet title action; preclusion doctrines bar relitigation | Court: Collateral estoppel bars relitigation; judgment affirmed |
| Whether Rule 60.02(3) relief is available when underlying judgment is alleged void for lack of jurisdiction | Worsham: Relief under Rule 60.02(3) is appropriate because judgment is void | Metro: Even if sought under Rule 60.02(3), the claim is precluded by prior final judgment | Court: Rule 60.02(3) motion denied because collateral estoppel applies; underlying jurisdictional claim already decided |
| Whether Worsham lacked a full and fair opportunity to litigate notice in the prior proceeding | Worsham: He did not get a full trial and therefore lacked a full and fair opportunity | Metro: Worsham had notice of the quiet title suit, answered, and had summary-judgment practice and appellate review | Court: Full and fair opportunity does not require a trial; summary-judgment disposition satisfied opportunity to be heard |
| Proper preclusion doctrine to apply (res judicata v. collateral estoppel) | Worsham: (implicit) prior judgment shouldn't preclude this attack | Metro: Prior adjudication bars relitigation | Court: Although trial court invoked res judicata, appellate court affirms on collateral estoppel grounds as the appropriate preclusion doctrine |
Key Cases Cited
- Bowen ex rel. Doe v. Arnold, 502 S.W.3d 102 (Tenn. 2016) (defines collateral estoppel elements and purpose)
- Mullins v. State, 294 S.W.3d 529 (Tenn. 2009) (explains requirement that issue be actually litigated for collateral estoppel)
- Creech v. Addington, 281 S.W.3d 363 (Tenn. 2009) (describes res judicata and its purposes)
- Lien v. Couch, 993 S.W.2d 53 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998) (lists elements required to invoke res judicata)