the Law Offices of John S. Young, P.C. v. Michael Deadman, Temporary Administrator of the Estate of John Edward Sullivan, 03-17-00148-CV

John S. Young’s law firm (the Law Office) contracted with John Edward Sullivan on a contingent-fee basis (27.5% of “all sums recovered”) to defend a civil forfeiture of Sullivan’s bank account.
Sullivan died in early June 2014; Young filed a holographic will naming himself sole beneficiary and obtained an order probating it as muniment of title, after which Young caused the disputed account funds to be transferred into an account in his name.
A district court entered an Agreed Final Judgment of Forfeiture finding Young to be the possessor/owner, forfeiting $500,000 to the State and releasing the remainder to Young.
A relative later challenged the will; Michael Deadman was appointed Temporary Administrator of Sullivan’s estate. The Law Office sued Deadman and the estate seeking 27.5% of the recovered sums as attorney’s fees.
Deadman moved for summary judgment on multiple grounds: (1) the estate cannot be sued as an entity; (2) no-evidence summary judgment that Sullivan never approved the settlement as required by the fee contract; and (3) traditional summary judgment arguing the attorney-client relationship terminated at death, no contract with Young or the estate, and no recovery under the agreement.
The trial court granted summary judgment for Deadman; the Court of Appeals affirmed, rejecting the Law Office’s contract and quantum meruit arguments and finding the contingent-fee agreement terminated at Sullivan’s death.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Law Office can enforce contingent-fee agreement after client’s death	Contract entitles Law Office to 27.5% of sums recovered; Sullivan approved settlement before death	Attorney-client relationship ended at death; no evidence Sullivan approved settlement; no contract with estate or beneficiary	Held: No — agreement terminated on death; no evidence Law Office recovered sums under that contract
Whether Young’s post-probate status bound the Law Office to the original contract	Young, as sole beneficiary and possessor, stepped into Sullivan’s shoes and could ratify/continue the agreement	No contract in record between Young (or estate) and Law Office; prior agreement does not automatically transfer	Held: No — no new contract with Young; prior agreement did not carry over
Whether Deadman ratified or accepted benefits such that Law Office can recover	Law Office argues Deadman accepted benefits of the settlement, implying ratification	Law Office waived ratification argument by not raising it below; no evidence of ratification	Held: No — ratification argument waived and unsupported
Whether Law Office can recover in quantum meruit	Law Office contends quantum meruit provides alternate recovery for services rendered	Deadman notes Law Office did not plead quantum meruit in trial court	Held: No — quantum meruit waived because not pleaded

Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Rincones, 520 S.W.3d 572 (Tex. 2017) (standard of review for summary judgment)
Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 656 (Tex. 2005) (summary judgment standards)
Murphy v. Murphy, 21 S.W.3d 797 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000) (per curiam) (attorney-client relationship terminates at client’s death)
Loffler v. University of Tex. Sys., 610 S.W.2d 188 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1980) (no automatic authority to represent decedent’s estate from pre-death relationship)
Dobbins v. Redden, 785 S.W.2d 377 (Tex. 1990) (failure to plead quantum meruit is dispositive)