710 F.3d 1294
11th Cir.2013Background
- Indigo Room hosts political events and activities, including Occupy Fort Myers support, and serves alcoholic beverages.
- Jones, age 19, entered to sign a petition on November 17, 2011; after he left, Gagnon cited him under Fort Myers Code § 6-83.
- Ordinance bars persons under 21 from entering or remaining in establishments serving alcohol, with listed exceptions.
- Exceptions include employees, persons with a parent, bona fide restaurant status, SRX license, or times when alcohol is not served to the public.
- Appellants filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging First and Fourteenth Amendment violations; moved for preliminary injunction covering Counts One–Four.
- District court denied the injunction; Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding no substantial likelihood of success on the merits.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does the licensing scheme violate First Amendment rights? | Indigo Room argues the Ordinance chills political speech and assembly. | City asserts no intrusion on protected speech; it regulates entry based on age, not speech itself. | No substantial likelihood of First Amendment violation |
| Is the Ordinance overbroad under the First Amendment? | Overbreadth captures protected conduct; ordinance affects political speech indirectly. | Ordinance mainly regulates admission, not speech; limited reach over protected conduct. | Not substantially overbroad |
| Is the Ordinance void-for-vagueness under the Fourteenth Amendment? | Ordinance lacks notice and could be applied inconsistently to establishments like bona fide restaurants. | Text provides clear categories and exceptions; no ambiguity for reasonable persons. | Not unconstitutionally vague |
| Is there a facial vagueness challenge to the Ordinance? | Under-21 entry ambiguity could render statute invalid on its face. | Core meaning exists: under-21 cannot enter alcoholic establishments; not facially invalid. | Not facially vague |
Key Cases Cited
- Gary v. City of Warner Robins, 311 F.3d 1334 (11th Cir. 2002) (ordinance restricting entry does not infringe on higher-protected speech)
- United States v. Frandsen, 212 F.3d 1231 (11th Cir. 2000) (defines prior restraint; aids analysis of licensing scheme)
- Bankshot Billiards, Inc. v. City of Ocala, Fla., 634 F.3d 1340 (11th Cir. 2011) (vagueness and chilling effects analyzed; notice and fair warning required)
- Mason v. Fla. Bar, 208 F.3d 952 (11th Cir. 2000) (vagueness requires common understanding of prohibitions)
- Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984) (due process and vagueness standards inform notice and conduct)
- Diversified Numismatics, Inc. v. City of Orlando, Fla., 949 F.2d 382 (11th Cir. 1991) (void-for-vagueness analysis in pre-enforcement context)
- Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 25 F.3d 999 (11th Cir. 1994) (vagueness principles for regulatory statutes)
- Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (U.S. Supreme Court, 1984) (core due process vagueness considerations)
