the Honorable Mark Henry, County Judge of Galveston County v. the Honorable Lonnie Cox, Judge of the 56th District Court of Galveston County
483 S.W.3d 119
| Tex. App. | 2015Background
- In July 2014 Galveston County Judge Mark Henry unilaterally terminated Bonita Quiroga, long-time Director of (Justice) Court Administration; judges claim the position primarily served the judiciary. Judges, led by Lonnie Cox (Local Administrative Judge), sought her reinstatement.
- Henry and county HR thereafter advertised and interviewed candidates and the commissioners set a new, lower salary range for a restructured court-administration position; judges objected that the process and reduced pay undermined judicial independence.
- Cox sued Henry seeking temporary and permanent injunctive relief to reinstate Quiroga to the role and salary in effect before July 24, 2014 and to block county actions to replace/reassign court administrative staff.
- After an evidentiary hearing the district court found Henry had interfered with the judiciary’s independence, issued a temporary injunction ordering reinstatement of Quiroga to her prior duties and salary and enjoining Henry and his agents from further interference.
- Henry appealed, arguing (inter alia) mootness after a statutory amendment, lack of subject-matter jurisdiction/standing, improper exercise of supervisory/inherent judicial power, procedural defects in the injunction, and that the injunction wrongly dictated a salary.
- The court of appeals affirmed the temporary injunction (with one justice concurring in part and dissenting in part), holding the district court acted within its inherent and supervisory authority and that the injunction was not moot or void.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Cox) | Defendant's Argument (Henry) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mootness of injunction given statutory amendment (Tex. Gov’t Code §75.401) | Amendment merely clarified judges’ authority; it does not moot ongoing constitutional injury or cure Henry’s prior interference | Amendment gives judges clear statutory authority to appoint and gives commissioners power to set salary, so injunction has no practical effect | Not moot: statutory change did not negate district court findings that Henry interfered with judicial independence; controversy remained live |
| Subject-matter jurisdiction / standing | Cox (as local administrative judge) suffered institutional injury to judiciary’s ability to perform functions and has standing to seek injunctive relief | Only Quiroga was injured (employment loss); Cox lacks standing; legislative immunity and absent commissioners are indispensable parties | Cox has standing to protect institutional/judicial interests; legislative immunity waived/not jurisdictional here; commissioners’ non-joinder not fatal at preliminary stage |
| Validity of supervisory / inherent judicial exercise (may court order reinstatement and payment) | District court may use inherent powers and exercise supervisory control over commissioners court to preserve status quo and protect judiciary from interference, including compelling reasonable funding/staffing pending trial | Commissioners’ budgetary/salary decisions are legislative/discretionary; district court may enjoin arbitrary acts but cannot itself set salaries or direct commissioners how to vote | Affirmed in part: temporary injunction valid as exercise of inherent and supervisory power to preserve status quo; district court did not exceed authority in issuing temporary relief pending trial |
| Procedural sufficiency of injunction (Rule 683/684, bond) | Order set detailed factual reasons and specified prohibited acts; prior bond retained and clerk approval required | Injunction failed to state irreparable harm with specificity and bond not shown approved by clerk, so order void | Rules satisfied: order explained reasons and detailed restraints; clerk’s approval of prior $100 deposit as bond deemed adequate; procedural challenges overruled |
Key Cases Cited
- Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198 (Tex. 2002) (status quo and standard for temporary injunctions)
- Mays v. Fifth Court of Appeals, 755 S.W.2d 78 (Tex. 1988) (recognizing courts’ inherent power to compel funding and staff when reasonably necessary)
- Vondy v. Comm’rs Court of Uvalde Cty., 620 S.W.2d 104 (Tex. 1981) (judiciary’s inherent power to secure compensation/funding for officials needed to administer justice)
- Eichelberger v. Eichelberger, 582 S.W.2d 395 (Tex. 1979) (description of inherent and implied powers of courts)
- In re Newton, 146 S.W.3d 648 (Tex. 2004) (definition of status quo for temporary injunctive relief)
- Ector Cty. v. Stringer, 843 S.W.2d 477 (Tex. 1992) (limits on district court: may order commissioners court to set reasonable salary but cannot itself substitute its discretion for commissioners)