The Florida Bar v. Michael Eugene Wynn
210 So. 3d 1271
| Fla. | 2017Background
- Respondent Michael E. Wynn received $500 from client Sylvia Rhodes on Oct. 10, 2013, to pay for deposition transcripts but deposited the money into his business operating account rather than his trust account and used it for business/personal expenses.
- Rhodes paid the reporter directly on Jan. 7, 2014, after Wynn failed to provide the transcripts; Wynn later promised to repay the $500 but delayed repayment and suggested offsetting additional services without a new agreement.
- After Rhodes filed a Bar grievance (Oct. 2014), Wynn repaid the $500 on Nov. 8, 2014, but conditioned repayment on Rhodes requesting dismissal of the grievance and provided a notarized receipt reflecting repayment; he also failed to timely provide required Bar disclosure and notice to his employer.
- The referee accepted a stipulation of facts and found violations of Rule 3-7.1(f) (notice to firm), 4-1.5 (fees and costs), 4-8.4(d) (conduct prejudicial to administration of justice), and 5-1.1 (trust accounts).
- The referee recommended a 90-day suspension plus two years’ probation with monitoring, reporting, and training conditions; The Florida Bar sought review and urged a one-year suspension.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (The Florida Bar) | Defendant's Argument (Wynn) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether respondent committed misconduct by converting client funds and mishandling trust/accounting obligations | Wynn converted client funds, conditioned repayment on complaint dismissal, and failed to timely notify employer—warrants suspension | Respondent stipulated to facts and asserted significant mitigation (remorse, repayment, rehabilitation) supporting shorter suspension | Court found violations of the cited Rules and that misconduct (conversion, conditioned repayment, late disclosures) occurred |
| Appropriate sanction length | One-year suspension followed by two years’ probation is appropriate given case law presuming disbarment for misappropriation but mitigation supports suspension | Referee recommended only 90-day suspension based on mitigation and cited authority | Court held 90 days was insufficient under precedent and imposed a one-year suspension followed by two years’ probation with the referee’s conditions |
| Whether referee’s relied-upon cases supported a short suspension | Bar argued the referee’s primary authority was unpublished or outdated and did not justify a 90-day sanction | Referee relied on prior decisions (including an unpublished disposition) to support 90 days | Court agreed Bar: referee’s 90-day recommendation lacked reasonable basis in published case law; one-year suspension more consistent with precedent |
| Additional remedies (costs, effective date, conditions) | Bar sought costs and full disciplinary conditions | Wynn sought prompt resolution and mitigation to limit sanction | Court awarded Bar costs ($3,975.45), required compliance with probation conditions, delayed effective date 30 days to wind up practice (or immediate if not practicing) |
Key Cases Cited
- Fla. Bar v. Frederick, 756 So. 2d 79 (Court imposed a 91-day suspension for complex misuse and related misconduct)
- Fla. Bar v. Smith, 866 So. 2d 41 (Court imposed one-year suspension for conversion of client funds plus other misconduct despite mitigation)
- Fla. Bar v. Corces, 639 So. 2d 604 (two-year suspension where attorney intentionally depleted trust account and later repaid over time)
- Fla. Bar v. McNamara, 634 So. 2d 166 (three-year suspension for conversion of third-party funds despite mitigating evidence)
- Fla. Bar v. Travis, 765 So. 2d 689 (misuse/misappropriation of client funds is among the most serious offenses and disbarment is presumptively appropriate)
- Fla. Bar v. Temmer, 753 So. 2d 555 (standard for Court’s review of referee discipline recommendations)
- Fla. Bar v. Anderson, 538 So. 2d 852 (Court has ultimate responsibility to order appropriate sanction)