THE ESTATE OF KYRA WARNER v. WELLPATH, 1:19-cv-00774

Kyra Warner ingested a fatal amount of meth/amphetamines while in Marion County Sheriff’s custody, suffered an anoxic brain injury, and later died; the Estate sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deliberate indifference.
A protective order governed discovery, and jail surveillance videos were among discovery materials identified as potentially confidential.
Plaintiff’s counsel Richard Waples provided video footage to Reuters and gave an on-camera interview; Reuters published an article on Oct. 16, 2020.
Waples filed a notice with the court acknowledging a possible protective-order breach and later argued the videos were not confidential because MCSO had not properly stamped them and had publicly filed them.
Defendants (Medical Defendants and MCSO) moved for sanctions under the court’s inherent power for (1) violating the protective order and (2) violating Indiana Rule of Professional Conduct 3.6 by prejudicial public statements.
The district court denied both motions: it found either no meaningful harm from any technical protective-order breach and that Waples’ statements reiterated claims already in the public record, so no Rule 3.6 sanction was warranted (but admonished Waples about his conduct and timing).

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Waples’ disclosure of jail videos to Reuters violated the protective order and warrants sanctions	Waples said he forgot the protective-order application until Reuters recontacted him; later argued videos were not designated confidential and MCSO publicly filed them	Defendants contend Waples violated the protective order by giving videos to media, waited to notify parties, and caused irreparable publicity harm; seek exclusion, monetary sanctions, and gag	Court: MCSO did designate videos confidential but had also filed them on the public docket; any technical violation caused no additional harm because videos were publicly accessible; sanctions denied (court admonished counsel on timing)
Whether Waples’ extrajudicial public statements violated Indiana RPC 3.6 and warrant sanctions	Waples: comments repeated allegations in the complaint and public filings and were permissible (claims/defenses and public-record information)	Defendants: statements were designed to sway public opinion/jury pool and impugn defendants’ character, creating substantial likelihood of prejudice	Court: statements largely mirrored plaintiff’s pleadings and public filings; Rule 3.6(b) permits discussing claims and public-record information; no sanction warranted

Union Oil Co. of California v. Leavell, 220 F.3d 562 (7th Cir. 2000) (requests to seal based solely on confidentiality designations are generally disfavored)
Baxter Intern., Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories, 297 F.3d 544 (7th Cir. 2002) (materials that influence judicial decisions are presumptively public absent bona fide confidentiality)
In re Violation of Rule 28(D), 635 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (most discovery that underpins judicial action must eventually be public)
New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (prior restraints on publication bear a heavy presumption against validity)
In the Matter of Steven C. Litz, 721 N.E.2d 258 (Ind. 1999) (attorney’s public statements can create a rebuttable presumption of prejudice under Rule 3.6)
In re Matter of Carl J. Brizzi, 962 N.E.2d 1240 (Ind. 2012) (public reprimand where prosecutorial statements posed a substantial likelihood of prejudicing proceedings)