519 S.W.3d 774
Ky.2017Background
- Michael Flick shot and killed Christina Wittich on May 20, 2005; he was arrested at the scene, indicted July 18, 2005, convicted January 2008, and sentenced to life.
- Wittich's parents were appointed co-administrators of her estate on November 16, 2006.
- The Estate filed a wrongful-death suit against Flick on August 22, 2008, nearly three years after the death and about 21 months after appointment of the administrators.
- Flick moved to dismiss as time-barred under Kentucky's one-year statute of limitations for wrongful-death claims; the trial court denied the motion, a jury rendered a large damages verdict, and the Court of Appeals reversed, ordering dismissal.
- The Kentucky Supreme Court reviewed whether the wrongful-death claim was barred by KRS 413.140(1)(a) and the tolling provisions of KRS 413.180 and 413.190, and affirmed the Court of Appeals.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| When does the one-year statute of limitations for wrongful death begin to run? | Estate: limitations tolls until criminal conviction; claim timely if filed after conviction. | Flick: limitations ran earlier — at appointment of personal representative or from death/indictment — so suit filed too late. | Held: limitations not tolled until conviction; wrongful-death claims governed by KRS 413.140(1)(a) and KRS 413.180; claim untimely. |
| Does KRS 413.180 toll or extend filing time for personal representatives in this context? | Estate: legislative changes / interpretation should allow later accrual. | Flick: KRS 413.180 does not extend beyond statutory one-year window in these facts. | Held: KRS 413.180 does not save the Estate; personal representative had to file within one year after qualification (or within prescribed limits). |
| Can KRS 413.190(2) toll the statute because defendant’s criminal prosecution obstructed civil suit? | Estate: Flick’s prosecution and alleged obstruction justify tolling until conviction. | Flick: he was apprehended, charged, detained, and did not abscond or conceal; no deceptive acts withheld knowledge. | Held: No tolling under KRS 413.190(2); Flick’s conduct did not mislead or prevent suit, and the Estate knew or should have known the claim by indictment. |
| Should the Court apply its ruling prospectively because of reliance on an appellate (unpublished) opinion? | Estate: prior Court of Appeals decision (DiGiuro v. Ragland) supported conviction-based accrual and suggested legislative acquiescence. | Flick: Ragland was unpublished after Supreme Court review and is not binding; longstanding law is one-year accrual. | Held: Decision is not merely prospective; Ragland was unpublished and not binding, and Hagan/Jacobs analogies do not justify prospective-only relief. |
Key Cases Cited
- Conner v. George W. Whitesides Co., 834 S.W.2d 652 (Ky. 1992) (personal representative has comparable time to prosecute decedent’s claims; KRS 413.180(2) applies to wrongful death)
- Gaither v. Commonwealth, 161 S.W.3d 345 (Ky. Ct. App. 2005) (recognizing one-year statute of limitations for wrongful-death claims under KRS 413.140)
- Cuppy v. General Acc. Fire & Life Assur. Corp., 378 S.W.2d 629 (Ky. 1964) (statute-of-limitations questions reviewed de novo)
- Emberton v. GMRI, Inc., 299 S.W.3d 565 (Ky. 2009) (concealment/obstruction requires misleading acts that prevent suit)
- Hagan v. Farris, 807 S.W.2d 488 (Ky. 1991) (Court may limit remedy prospectively to avoid injustice in certain reliance contexts)