The David and Marvel Benton Trust v. McCarty
161 Idaho 145
| Idaho | 2016Background
- David and Marvel Benton established a revocable trust in 1990; they were grantors and trustees. In 2010 they signed a quitclaim deed purporting to convey property (the Benton Engineering building and adjacent parking/rights) to Dorothy McCarty.
- The Quitclaim Deed’s face description used landmarks and an address (550/560 Linden Drive) and vague references to adjacent parking and access; McCarty later recorded a revised deed with a detailed metes-and-bounds attachment signed only by David and Marvel.
- Between the two dates, the Bentons executed a Second Amendment (Nov. 1, 2010) adding Family Co-Trustees and requiring at least one Family Co-Trustee signature for Trust transactions. The Revised Quitclaim Deed was not signed by any Family Co-Trustee.
- The Trust sued to quiet title and sought rents/profits; cross-motions for summary judgment followed. McCarty submitted many affidavits including testimony about the Bentons’ intent and an expert survey. The district court struck testimony about the Bentons’ intent as irrelevant.
- The district court held the original Quitclaim Deed’s property description was legally insufficient (so no conveyance), the Revised Quitclaim Deed was ineffective because the Second Amendment barred the Bentons from acting alone, and doctrines like reformation/correction did not save the deed. This appeal followed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (McCarty) | Defendant's Argument (Trust) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Does Idaho Code §55-606 bar the Trust from challenging the deed? | §55-606 makes recorded conveyances conclusive; Trust cannot later challenge its own deed. | §55-606 is a recording statute that applies only where a valid conveyance occurred; it does not bar challenges to enforceability. | Court: §55-606 does not bar grantors/successors from challenging a deed’s enforceability when the document fails to effect a conveyance. |
| 2. Was district court correct to exclude affidavits about the grantors’ intent? | Parol/extrinsic evidence should be admissible to resolve ambiguities and show intent. | Intent of parties is irrelevant to the objective legal sufficiency of a written property description; parol evidence not allowed unless the writing references it. | Court: Exclusion proper; sufficiency is an objective legal question and parol evidence is barred absent reference in the deed. |
| 3. Is the Quitclaim Deed’s property description legally sufficient? | The deed and revised metes-and-bounds (and surveys) identify the property; the building/address description is adequate and metes-and-bounds controls. | The face description is vague and does not permit exact identification of all areas claimed; claimant relied on extrinsic evidence. | Court: Deed’s description is insufficient as a matter of law; cannot exactly identify conveyed property without extrinsic materials, so conveyance failed. |
| 4. Did the Second Amendment invalidate the Revised Quitclaim Deed? | The Second Amendment applies only if the Bentons were disabled at the time of the transaction; thus Revised Deed could be valid. | Amendment unambiguously requires not less than two signatures on all trust transactions and forbids the grantors from acting alone in any event. | Court: Amendment unambiguously barred David and Marvel from acting alone; Revised deed unsigned by Family Co-Trustees was ineffective. |
Key Cases Cited
- Worley Highway Dist. v. Kootenai Cnty., 98 Idaho 925, 576 P.2d 206 (Idaho 1978) (a conveyance must contain a sufficient property description or it cannot pass title)
- Garner v. Bartschi, 139 Idaho 430, 80 P.3d 1031 (Idaho 2003) (parol evidence not allowed to supply omitted property description; description must permit exact identification)
- City of Kellogg v. Mission Mountain Interests Ltd. Co., 135 Idaho 239, 16 P.3d 915 (Idaho 2000) (a building identified by name may suffice to convey the land directly under it)
- Lexington Heights Dev., LLC v. Crandlemire, 140 Idaho 276, 92 P.3d 526 (Idaho 2004) (descriptions that leave essential boundaries or excluded areas to future agreement are insufficient)
- Ray v. 146 Idaho 625, 200 P.3d 1174 (Idaho 2009) (a physical address alone does not satisfy the statute of frauds for real property conveyances)
- White v. Rehn, 103 Idaho 1, 644 P.2d 323 (Idaho 1982) (parol evidence may identify a description referenced in the writing but cannot supply a missing description)