The Dana R. Hodges Trust v. United States, 111 Fed. Cl. 452

Hodges and Austin involve rail-to-trail conversions of the railroad corridors in Michigan under the Trails Act, with plaintiffs claiming loss of crossing access on bisected parcels.
Surface Transportation Board issued NITUs during negotiations for trail use and eventual transfer of the lines to trail operators via quitclaims.
Trail Use Agreements purport to convey railroad rights subject to existing roads, occupancies, encroachments, servitudes, and other pre-existing rights.
Plaintiffs seek severance damages and argue that Trails Act pre-empts state-law crossing rights, effectively treating encumbered land as taken.
Defendant argues the Trails Act preserves pre-existing crossing rights, and that the court should value the after-taking condition without treating the land as a full-fee takings.
Court must determine whether Trails Act forecloses state-law crossing rights or merely preserves them, affecting just compensation valuation.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Does the Trails Act preempt pre-existing crossing rights?	Hodges argues the STB's § 1247(d) pre-empts state rights to use encumbered land.	Trails Act does not eliminate pre-existing crossing rights; rights are preserved by trail use agreements.	Trails Act does not preempt pre-existing crossing rights.
Do trail use agreements preserve crossings for recorded or unrecorded rights?	Crossing rights are extinguished or uncertain due to private agreements.	Agreements preserve all existing roads, occupancies, and servitudes, whether recorded or not.	Trail use agreements preserve pre-existing crossings; status quo largely retained.
Should severance damages treat encumbered land as a full-fee taking?	Loss of access reduces value of remaining land; seek severance damages as fee-taking.	Value should reflect retained access rights and state-law mechanisms for crossing rights; no full-fee taking attributable to Trails Act.	Crossing rights are not eliminated; damages proceed under valuation framework acknowledging preserved/possible rights.
Can landowners pursue easements by necessity or quasi-easements given the Trails Act?	Easements by necessity may be foreclosed or uncertain due to Trails Act.	Michigan law permits easements by necessity or quasi-easements; Trails Act does not bar such state-law claims.	Plaintiffs may pursue state-law crossing rights where appropriate; Trails Act did not foreclose them.

United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369 (U.S. 1943) (owner must be put in as good a position as if not taken)
Hendler v. United States, 175 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (severance damages and partial taking considerations in takings)
United States v. Grizzard, 219 U.S. 180 (U.S. 1911) (principles of partial taking and related property rights)
Preseault v. United States, 100 F.3d 1525 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (Preseault II; preemption limits and rail corridor takings context)
Illig v. United States, 58 Fed. Cl. 619 (Fed. Cl. 2003) (easement characteristics retained in trail conversions)
Grantwood Village v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 95 F.3d 654 (8th Cir. 1996) (ICC/abandonment preemption; federal preemption scope)
Moore v. United States, 61 Fed. Cl. 73 (Fed. Cl. 2004) (severance damages and purchaser valuation with potential access constraints)