the City of Watauga v. Russell Gordon
434 S.W.3d 586
| Tex. | 2014Background
- Russell Gordon was stopped and arrested on suspicion of DWI; he submitted to arrest without resisting and was handcuffed twice during custody and transport.
- Gordon alleged he repeatedly told officers the handcuffs were too tight and causing pain, but officers did not loosen them.
- He sued the City of Watauga under the Texas Tort Claims Act, alleging negligent use of tangible personal property (handcuffs).
- The City filed a plea to the jurisdiction asserting governmental immunity under the Tort Claims Act’s intentional-tort exception (battery/assault). The trial court denied the plea; the court of appeals affirmed.
- The Supreme Court of Texas granted review to resolve whether the claim is negligence (waiver of immunity) or battery (no waiver) and whether conflict jurisdiction existed.
- The Court held the claim arises from a battery (an intentional tort or offensive contact) even if injury was unintended, so governmental immunity was not waived and the suit must be dismissed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether injuries from allegedly excessively tight handcuffs state negligence or battery | Gordon: officers did not intend to injure; accidental injury = negligence | City: arresting contact is a battery; excessive force falls within intentional-tort exception | Battery: excessive force during lawful arrest arises from battery, not negligence; immunity not waived |
| Whether compliance with arrest equals legal consent to offensive touching | Gordon: compliance shows no resistance, implying consent | City: submission to arrest is not legal consent to offensive or excessive force | Compliance is not consent; submission to legal authority ≠ consent to offensive contact |
| Whether intent to injure is required for battery | Gordon: specific intent to injure distinguishes intentional tort from negligence | City: battery can be committed by offensive contact without intent to injure | Intent to cause offensive contact (not necessarily injury) suffices for battery; specific intent to injure not required |
| Whether Tort Claims Act waives immunity for claims based on handcuff injuries | Gordon: alleges negligent use of tangible property under §101.021 | City: claim arises from intentional tort excluded by §101.057(2) | Waiver does not apply; intentional-tort exception bars suit against the City |
Key Cases Cited
- Fisher v. Carrousel Motor Hotel, Inc., 424 S.W.2d 627 (Tex. 1967) (recognizes actionable offensive-contact battery)
- Reed Tool Co. v. Copelin, 689 S.W.2d 404 (Tex. 1985) (distinguishes specific intent to injure in worker’s compensation context)
- Univ. of Tex. Med. Branch v. York, 871 S.W.2d 175 (Tex. 1994) (Tort Claims Act waiver for negligent use of tangible property)
- Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Petta, 44 S.W.3d 575 (Tex. 2001) (intentional-tort exception to Tort Claims Act)
- Waffle House, Inc. v. Williams, 313 S.W.3d 796 (Tex. 2010) (discussion of assault/battery elements in civil context)
- City of San Antonio v. Dunn, 796 S.W.2d 258 (Tex. App.–San Antonio) (excessive handcuffing arises from battery)
- District of Columbia v. Chinn, 839 A.2d 701 (D.C. 2003) (explains why excessive-force claims during arrest are battery, not negligence)