The City of Houston v. Steve Williams, 353 S.W.3d 128

The City of Houston sought to dismiss a suit by 540 former firefighters alleging underpayment of lump-sum termination benefits.
The case arises on remand after statute changes; Local Government Code §271.152 waives immunity for breach-of-contract claims if a qualifying contract exists.
Firefighters contend three writings—Ordinances, Chapter 143 civil-service provisions, and MCAs/CBA—constitute qualifying contracts; City contends only some do.
Court previously held Ordinances and MCAs/CBA potentially qualify; Chapter 143 alone does not establish a contract.
Court holds Ordinances and MCAs/CBA comprise contracts; Chapter 143 alone does not; remands for merits consistent with this opinion; §271.152 retroactive waiver applies to these contracts.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Ordinances constitute a contract under §271.151(2).	Ordinances collectively form a unilateral employment contract.	Ordinances do not form a contract or are not properly executed.	Ordinances constitute a unilateral contract under §271.151(2).
Whether MCAs and CBA qualify as contracts and confer standing.	MCAs and CBA were intended to benefit Firefighters; Firefighters have standing as third-party beneficiaries.	Standing issues negate enforceability.	MCAs and CBA qualify; Firefighters have standing as third-party beneficiaries to enforce them.
Whether Chapter 143 alone constitutes a contract for §271.152 purposes.	Chapter 143, adopted by City, is a contract offered to Firefighters.	Chapter 143 is not a contract communicated by the City.	Chapter 143 alone does not constitute a stand-alone contract subject to §271.152.
Relation between §271.152 and §180.006 retroactive vs prospective waivers.	§271.152 retroactively waives immunity for contract claims.	§180.006 retroactively waives only back-pay claims; §271.152 would be useless if both applied.	§271.152 provides retroactive waiver and is not rendered useless by §180.006.

Tooke v. City of Mexia, 197 S.W.3d 325 (Tex. 2006) (addressing scope of immunity and waivers)
City of Houston v. Williams (Williams I), 216 S.W.3d 827 (Tex. 2007) (sovereign immunity and contract-based claims; remedy is money damages)
Overton v. City of Houston, 564 S.W.2d 400 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston 1st Dist. 1978) (ordinances alone cannot form a contract (in some contexts))
Byrd v. City of Dallas, 6 S.W.2d 738 (Tex. 1928) (pension plans/contractual integration with ordinances)
Kirby Lake Dev. Ltd. v. Clear Lake City Water Auth., 320 S.W.3d 829 (Tex. 2010) (essential terms in contracts; multiple writings may form a contract)
Fort Worth Indep. Sch. Dist. v. City of Fort Worth, 22 S.W.3d 831 (Tex. 2000) (reading multiple documents together to ascertain contract intent)
Vanegas v. Am. Energy Servs., 302 S.W.3d 299 (Tex. 2009) (unilateral contracts; performance creates enforceable contract)
Wilson v. Andrews, 10 S.W.3d 663 (Tex. 1999) (Civil Service Act incorporated into employment contract; contract terms read into agreement)
McNeill v. City of Waco, 33 S.W.2d 322 (Tex. 1895) (municipal obligations payable from current revenues; historical contract concepts)