The Chlorine Institute, Inc. v. Soo Line Railroad, 792 F.3d 903

Background

In 2009 PHMSA (DOT) revised TIH tank-car rules but declined to mandate retirement of pre-1989 non-normalized steel cars, instead requiring owners to prioritize their retirement; PHMSA signaled its standards were minimums pending more stringent performance standards.
On April 14, 2014, Soo Line/Canadian Pacific (CP) issued Tariff Item 55 requiring TIH shipments on its lines to use normalized-steel tank cars to increase crashworthiness and reduce spill risk.
The Chlorine Institute and several industry groups sued under the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act and 49 U.S.C. § 11101, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to enjoin CP’s requirement as conflicting with DOT rules.
The district court applied the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, concluded the Surface Transportation Board (STB) should first decide whether CP’s extra-regulatory requirement is reasonable, denied a preliminary injunction, and dismissed without prejudice.
The Eighth Circuit affirmed: it held the STB has authority to review carrier-imposed requirements beyond DOT regulations and that the STB is the appropriate forum for the reasonableness inquiry; it also upheld denial of injunctive relief (no irreparable harm, balanced harms/public interest favor CP).

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the doctrine of primary jurisdiction requires referral to STB	Appellants: legal question; DOT has exclusive jurisdiction over tank-car specs so no agency expertise issue	CP: reasonableness of carrier-imposed safety rules involves STB expertise and national rail policy	Court: Primary jurisdiction applies; STB best suited to decide reasonableness and uniformity issues
Whether CP may impose requirements stricter than DOT rules as a matter of law	Appellants: CP cannot override or effectively veto DOT regulations by imposing stricter carrier rules	CP: carriers may seek approval of stricter practices; prior precedent allows ICC/STB review of such carrier requirements	Court: Not barred as a matter of law; STB can assess whether additional requirements are reasonable
Whether the district court should have stayed rather than dismissed without prejudice after referral	Appellants: dismissal prejudices plaintiffs; stay preferred	CP: STB resolution likely dispositive; dismissal without prejudice appropriate	Court: Dismissal without prejudice was not an abuse of discretion given likely STB resolution and lack of shown prejudice
Whether preliminary injunctive relief should have been granted pending STB decision	Appellants: irreparable harm, likelihood of success, public interest favor injunction	CP: no irreparable harm to shippers shown; public safety and CP interests weigh against injunction; plaintiffs unlikely to prevail on merits	Court: Denial affirmed — plaintiffs failed to show irreparable harm or clear likelihood of success; balance of harms and public interest favor CP

Key Cases Cited

Reiter v. Cooper, 507 U.S. 258 (1993) (doctrine of primary jurisdiction permits agency determination of issues within its expertise)
Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 646 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (ICC may review and reject carrier-imposed safety practices as unreasonable even when DOT/NRC set industry standards)
Akron, Canton & Youngstown R.R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 611 F.2d 1162 (6th Cir. 1979) (carriers may seek approval for stricter safety practices; ICC may allow more stringent rules for individual carriers)
DeBruce Grain, Inc. v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 149 F.3d 787 (8th Cir. 1998) (reasonableness questions involving rail industry are often best resolved by STB/ICC under primary jurisdiction)
Dataphase Sys., Inc. v. CL Sys., Inc., 640 F.2d 109 (8th Cir. 1981) (four-factor test for preliminary injunction)
General Motors Corp. v. Harry Brown's, LLC, 563 F.3d 312 (8th Cir. 2009) (standard of review for preliminary injunction: factual findings for clear error, legal conclusions de novo, equitable judgment for abuse of discretion)