The Cherokee Nation v. Stitt, 475 F.Supp.3d 1277

Plaintiffs are eight federally recognized Oklahoma tribes; Defendant is the Governor of Oklahoma sued in his official capacity. The tribes and intervenors filed motions for partial summary judgment; the State cross-moved.
The tribes executed identical Tribal‑State gaming Compacts under Oklahoma’s State‑Tribal Gaming Act (STGA) using a statutory model compact; each Compact became effective in 2005–2006 under IGRA.
Part 15(B) of the Compacts set an initial term ending January 1, 2020, and provided for automatic 15‑year renewals if, at that time, "organization licensees or others" were authorized to conduct electronic gaming other than pari‑mutuel wagering "pursuant to any governmental action of the state" taken after the Compact’s effective date.
After the Compacts took effect, the Oklahoma Horse Racing Commission (OHRC) promulgated rules and issued licenses to racetracks to conduct electronic gaming, including licenses issued in October 2019 for calendar year 2020.
The central dispute: did the post‑Compact OHRC rules and licensing constitute the required "governmental action of the state" to trigger automatic renewal, or was "governmental action" limited to legislative acts? The court resolved competing summary judgment motions.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the Compacts automatically renewed on Jan. 1, 2020	OHRC’s post‑Compact rules and licensing authorized racetracks to conduct electronic gaming "pursuant to" state governmental action, so the renewal condition was met	Authorization was a legislative function; STGA already authorized racetrack gaming before the Compacts, and OHRC’s post‑Compact licensing is merely administrative, so no new governmental action occurred	Held: Compacts automatically renewed for 15 years; OHRC actions satisfied the renewal condition
Whether "governmental action of the state" is limited to legislative enactments	The ordinary meaning of "governmental action" includes executive‑branch agency actions such as OHRC rulemaking and licensing	"Governmental" should be read as "legislative"; agency acts cannot trigger renewal and cannot bind the State indefinitely	Held: Court rejects the narrow, legislative‑only reading and applies the ordinary meaning, encompassing OHRC’s actions
Whether the proviso about renegotiation in Part 15(B) prevented automatic renewal	Renewal conditions are separate from any renegotiation proviso; Defendant did not properly invoke the proviso	Timely renegotiation requests can be a condition precedent to renewal, and Defendant attempted to invoke renegotiation	Held: The proviso does not negate automatic renewal here; Defendant’s renegotiation request did not operate to avoid renewal

Citizen Potawatomi Nation v. Oklahoma, 881 F.3d 1226 (10th Cir. 2018) (gaming compacts interpreted under federal common law; unambiguous contract language governs)
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (summary judgment standard; what constitutes a genuine dispute)
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) (movant’s initial burden to show absence of genuine issue of material fact)
Pub. Serv. Co. of Okla. v. Burlington N. R. Co., 53 F.3d 1090 (10th Cir. 1995) (interpretation of an unambiguous contract is a question of law appropriate for summary judgment)
Doe 1 v. AOL LLC, 552 F.3d 1077 (9th Cir. 2009) (give words their ordinary meaning absent special circumstances)
Kellogg v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 549 F.3d 818 (10th Cir. 2008) (contract construction does not impose special meanings unless circumstances require)