The Boeing Company v. Maziar Movassaghi
2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 18016
| 9th Cir. | 2014Background
- Santa Susana Field Laboratory (SSFL) was used for federal rocket and nuclear research; much of the radioactive contamination resulted from federal activity; Boeing owns most of the land and was a DOE contractor for cleanup.
- DOE supervised radioactive cleanup and adopted a cleanup plan (industrial/recreational/residential standards); Boeing performs cleanup as DOE’s contractor and shares some cleanup costs.
- California enacted SB 990 requiring cleanup to a more stringent "suburban residential or rural residential (agricultural)" standard (effectively a subsistence‑farming standard) and barred transfer of the property until that standard is met.
- Boeing sued, challenging SB 990 as unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause and the doctrine of intergovernmental immunity; the district court ruled for Boeing on immunity grounds.
- The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding SB 990 impermissibly regulated and discriminated against the federal government and its contractor; the court did not decide federal preemption or Boeing’s § 1983 claim.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Boeing has standing | Boeing: as landowner and cost‑sharing contractor, SB 990 injures it (transfer ban, potential costs). | California amici: Boeing lacks injury because federal contractor paid to perform cleanup. | Held: Boeing has standing—transfer prohibition and possible uncovered costs constitute injury. |
| Whether SB 990 directly regulates federal activity in violation of intergovernmental immunity | Boeing: SB 990 prescribes cleanup standards and procedures that directly control DOE’s cleanup operations and contractor performance. | California: State authority and agreements permit state regulation; argument that contractor status limits immunity. | Held: SB 990 directly regulates federal cleanup activity and is invalid absent clear congressional authorization; none exists here. |
| Whether SB 990 discriminates against the federal government / federal contractors | Boeing: SB 990 singles out SSFL and imposes more stringent standards than those applied elsewhere, discriminating against federal operations and Boeing as contractor. | California: Contamination and local concern justify unique statute; contractor status means Boeing cannot claim immunity beyond government. | Held: SB 990 is discriminatory because it imposes substantially more stringent requirements on DOE/Boeing than on others, violating intergovernmental immunity. |
| Whether any federal statute (AEA, RCRA, CERCLA) authorizes or preempts SB 990 | Boeing: federal statutes and DOE authority occupy the field for federal radioactive cleanup; states may not override. | California: Various cooperative regimes and CERCLA/RCRA provisions allow or preserve state roles. | Held: Court did not find a clear congressional authorization under the Atomic Energy Act; RCRA excludes radioactive materials; CERCLA waiver does not allow more stringent state standards for federal facilities—court resolved on immunity grounds and did not rule on field preemption. |
Key Cases Cited
- Mayo v. United States, 319 U.S. 441 (1943) (federal activities are free from state regulation under the Supremacy Clause)
- Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller, 486 U.S. 174 (1988) (federally owned facility performing federal functions is shielded from direct state regulation even when run by private contractor absent clear congressional authorization)
- North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423 (1990) (state law invalid if it discriminates against the federal government)
- Davis v. Michigan Dep’t of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803 (1989) (private parties dealing with the federal government can invoke intergovernmental immunity when state law discriminates)
- United States v. City of Arcata, 629 F.3d 986 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing standards for state regulation of federal activities)
- Gartrell Constr., Inc. v. Aubry, 940 F.2d 437 (9th Cir. 1991) (state regulation preempted where it interferes with federal contractors’ performance)
- Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979) (restrictive state regulation of property can constitute concrete injury for standing)
- United States v. Manning, 527 F.3d 828 (9th Cir. 2008) (standard of review and related federal‑state regulatory principles)