The Bank of New York Mellon v. Danielle Shone, 239 A.3d 671

Bank of New York Mellon sued to foreclose a 2005 mortgage after alleged default; the Bank relied on a notice of default and a USPS certificate of mailing as evidence.
The Bank initially failed to qualify the notice via a law‑firm witness (improper witness listing) and by affidavit (902(11) notice defect); it then called Bayview litigation manager James D’Orlando.
The trial court excluded the notice because D’Orlando lacked personal knowledge of the law firm’s practices for creating/mailing the notice; the court entered judgment for Shone and Buck.
On appeal the Maine Law Court framed the issue as the foundational showing required to admit an "integrated" business record (a record created by one entity and incorporated into another’s records).
The Court invited supplemental briefing (including whether to align Maine law with the federal approach in U.S. Bank Trust v. Jones) and ultimately reaffirmed the 1984 Soley integrated‑records approach.
Holding: the Court vacated the judgment and remanded for the trial court to determine, under the Soley test (integration + verification + reliance, subject to opponent showing lack of trustworthiness), whether the notice is admissible; dissent argued this improperly departs from more recent Maine precedent and amounts to rulemaking.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Proper foundational showing to admit an integrated business record under M.R. Evid. 803(6)	The receiving business need only show it integrated, verified, and relied on the record (no testimony about the originating business required)	A proponent must present testimony establishing the originating business’s recordkeeping practices (witness must have personal knowledge)	Reaffirmed Soley: receiving business may establish admissibility by showing integration, verification, and reliance; admissibility still defeated if opponent shows lack of trustworthiness
Trial court’s exclusion of the notice of default and resulting judgment	Exclusion was erroneous; the Bank’s witness testimony should have sufficed under integrated‑records approach	Exclusion was correct because the Bank’s witness lacked knowledge of the law firm’s practices	Judgment vacated and case remanded for the trial court to apply the Soley standard to the existing record (or reopen for more evidence)
Whether Maine should follow the federal First Circuit approach (Jones)	Urged alignment with Jones and federal precedent for uniformity and practical necessity in mortgage cases	Argued recent Maine cases (Carter, Radley, Plaisted, Eddins) set a different, more exacting standard and stare decisis counsels retention	Court adopted the federal‑aligned Soley approach; dissent contends this departs from later Maine precedent and improperly acts as rulemaking

Northeast Bank & Trust Co. v. Soley, 481 A.2d 1123 (Me. 1984) (adopted integrated‑records approach where receiving business integrated and relied on outside information)
U.S. Bank Tr., N.A. v. Jones, 925 F.3d 534 (1st Cir. 2019) (federal endorsement of admitting records received from others when recipient verifies, integrates, and relies on them)
Beneficial Maine Inc. v. Carter, 25 A.3d 96 (Me. 2011) (Maine decisions requiring a qualified witness with knowledge of recordkeeping practices; later decisions interpreted Carter to require proof about originating business)
State v. Radley, 804 A.2d 1127 (Me. 2002) (held proponent cannot admit upstream records through a witness lacking knowledge of the originator’s practices)
MRT Constr. v. Hardrives, Inc., 158 F.3d 478 (9th Cir. 1998) (articulated test: recipient’s records admissible when kept in regular course, relied upon, and recipient has substantial interest in accuracy)
United States v. Ullrich, 580 F.2d 765 (5th Cir. 1978) (example of verification via recipient’s integration and use in daily operations supporting admissibility)