The Bank of New York Mellon v. Laskowski, 71 N.E.3d 1125

Bank sued to foreclose mortgage on property owned by Mark Laskowski; complaint alleged Pacific Realty Group (Pacific) had a recorded memorandum suggesting an equitable interest. Note and mortgage were attached. Summons directed service on Pacific by publication.
Bank filed affidavits of diligent search and published service; certificate of publication was filed. Pacific was served by publication and did not initially appear.
Court entered default and a judgment of foreclosure and sale in July 2012; property sold at sheriff’s sale in February 2013.
On April 18, 2013, Pacific’s counsel filed an appearance; the same day the court dismissed the case for want of prosecution (DWP) because Bank’s counsel failed to appear. The DWP was vacated May 30, 2013, and the case reinstated; the court granted Pacific leave to file its appearance.
Pacific filed a motion to quash service of process on July 18, 2013 (about 90 days after its April appearance), arguing service by publication was improper under the LLC Act; the trial court denied the motion as untimely under 735 ILCS 5/15-1505.6(a) and because publication complied with the Foreclosure Law. Trial court later confirmed sale and distribution; Pacific appealed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Pacific’s motion to quash service was timely under 735 ILCS 5/15-1505.6(a)	Bank: statute’s 60-day clock began when Pacific filed its appearance on April 18, 2013; Pacific waited ~90 days, so motion untimely	Pacific: the 60-day period was tolled while the case was dismissed for want of prosecution (Apr 18–May 30), so its July 18 motion was timely	Court: Motion untimely. Statute’s plain language starts the 60-day clock on appearance (or participation), and no tolling for DWP is provided; denial affirmed.

Blum v. Koster, 235 Ill. 2d 21 (2009) (plain statutory language controls construction)
Case v. Galesburg Cottage Hospital, 227 Ill. 2d 207 (2007) (time during dismissal not counted when assessing diligence under different Rule/statute)
Muskat v. Sternberg, 122 Ill. 2d 41 (1988) (principles on counting intervening time when measuring statutory periods)