The Bank of New York Mellon, etc. v. Condominium Association of La Mer Estates, Inc., 175 So. 3d 282

Condominium association obtained foreclosure title to unit after mortgagee defaulted; Bank of New York Mellon (BNY Mellon) later acquired the mortgage by assignment.
Association sued to quiet title, alleging its ownership and that the bank’s mortgage was a cloud; the bank was served twice, defaulted both times, and did not appear at the final-judgment hearing.
Trial court entered a final judgment quieting title in favor of the association; the bank later moved under Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.540(b) to vacate, arguing the complaint failed to state a cause of action so the judgment was void.
The trial court granted the motion and vacated the judgment; the Fourth District reversed, holding the default judgment was voidable (not void) where the defendant was properly served and had opportunity to be heard.
Florida Supreme Court granted review and affirmed the Fourth District, holding failure to state a cause of action renders a default judgment voidable—subject to waiver—rather than void, and disapproved contrary First and Third DCA decisions.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a default judgment is void when the underlying complaint fails to state a cause of action	Association: judgment valid; bank waived defects by not appearing or appealing	Bank: complaint failed to state a claim so judgment is void and may be vacated at any time	Judgment is voidable, not void; defenses like failure to state a claim can be waived if not timely raised
Whether Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.540(b)’s one-year limitation applies to challenges claiming a judgment is void for failing to state a cause of action	Association: rule bars late collateral attack	Bank: if judgment is void, rule’s time limit does not apply	Rule 1.540(b) time limit does not apply only to truly void judgments; here judgment was voidable and time bar applies
Effect of prior DCA precedent holding such defaults void	Association: follow majority precedent affirming finality	Bank: rely on Southeast Land Developers and Moynet that such judgments are void	Florida Supreme Court disapproved those DCA decisions to the extent inconsistent and followed precedent treating such judgments as voidable
Role of notice and opportunity to be heard in judging voidness	Association: adequate notice/ opportunity existed; due process supports finality	Bank: substance of pleading controls; default cannot create a cause of action	Adequate notice/opportunity to be heard means defects may be waived; absence of such deprivation distinguishes void from voidable judgments

Curbelo v. Ullman, 571 So.2d 443 (Fla. 1990) (judgment not void where court had jurisdiction and parties had opportunity to be heard)
State ex rel. Coleman v. Williams, 3 So.2d 152 (Fla. 1941) (distinguishing void and voidable judgments; finality limits collateral attack)
Malone v. Meres, 109 So. 677 (Fla. 1926) (early discussion of voidness and jurisdictional defects)
Pino v. Bank of N.Y., 121 So.3d 23 (Fla. 2013) (standards for de novo review of rule interpretation)
Bane v. Bane, 775 So.2d 938 (Fla. 2000) (scope and purpose of rule 1.540 relief)
Miller v. Fortune Ins. Co., 484 So.2d 1221 (Fla. 1986) (discussion of finality and relief from judgments)
Becerra v. Equity Imports, Inc., 551 So.2d 486 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) (relied upon by some DCAs for voidness principle)
Southeast Land Developers, Inc. v. All Fla. Site & Utils., Inc., 28 So.3d 166 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (held default judgment void when complaint failed to state a claim; disapproved to extent inconsistent)
Moynet v. Courtois, 8 So.3d 377 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009) (similar holding; disapproved to extent inconsistent)
Stark v. Frayer, 67 So.2d 287 (Fla. 1953) (on requirements for a quiet-title pleading)