33 F.4th 1042
8th Cir.2022Background
- Plaintiffs are parents of children with disabilities who sought reasonable COVID‑19‑related accommodations (including mask requirements) under the ADA and §504 after Iowa enacted Iowa Code § 280.31, which broadly restricted school mask mandates.
- The district court entered a preliminary injunction completely barring enforcement of § 280.31; State officials appealed.
- The appellate majority vacated the preliminary injunction as prudentially moot, reasoning pandemic conditions (vaccine availability to young children, waning variants, lower transmission) made the injunction no longer capable of providing meaningful relief.
- The panel emphasized § 280.31’s exception for “any other provision of law,” construing “any” to encompass federal law so that federal mask requirements/accommodations are not precluded.
- Judge Kelly dissented: she argued vacatur was improper sua sponte because the record lacks current, individualized factfinding about Plaintiffs’ children’s present COVID‑19 risk and the appellate court should have remanded for expedited factfinding/trial on the merits.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mootness of preliminary injunction due to changed pandemic conditions | Injunction remains necessary; Plaintiffs’ children still face individualized heightened risks; record lacks current evidence so vacatur is premature | Vaccines, lower transmission, and variant changes mean the injunction can no longer provide effective relief | Majority: vacated injunction as prudentially moot; dissent: vacatur improper without remand/factfinding |
| Whether enjoining § 280.31 now provides effective relief to Plaintiffs | An injunction is required to permit schools to impose mask accommodations under ADA/§504 | Enjoining § 280.31 has no practical effect now because children’s risk is low; therefore relief would be ineffective | Majority: no effective relief now (moot); dissent: disputed given individual risks in record |
| Scope of § 280.31’s exception for "any other provision of law" (state v. federal law) | Plaintiffs: federal law can require masking as a reasonable accommodation; § 280.31’s exception should allow compliance with federal law | Defendants: acknowledge exception but argue enforcement now is moot; did not contest that federal law could supersede § 280.31 where applicable | Court: the exception unambiguously covers "any" provision of law, including federal law, so § 280.31 does not bar mask requirements compelled by other law |
| Likelihood of success on ADA/§504 failure‑to‑accommodate claim | Plaintiffs showed (on the record) high likelihood of success: qualifying disabled students, schools receive federal funds, and § 280.31 was being enforced to prevent reasonable mask accommodations | Defendants produced no evidence of undue administrative or financial burden or fundamental alteration to schooling from limited mask accommodations | Dissent (reviewing district record): concluded the record supported a preliminary injunction on these merits; majority vacated on mootness grounds and left merits undecided |
Key Cases Cited
- South Dakota v. Hazen, 914 F.2d 147 (8th Cir. 1990) (passage of time and seasonality can render a claim moot)
- Ringo v. Lombardi, 677 F.3d 793 (8th Cir. 2012) (mootness where protocol cannot be carried out due to third‑party action/drug unavailability)
- Ali v. Cangemi, 419 F.3d 722 (8th Cir. 2005) (when a court cannot grant effective relief, the case is moot; discussion of prudential mootness)
- Ahmad v. City of St. Louis, 995 F.3d 635 (8th Cir. 2021) (modifying/dissolving preliminary injunction requires changed circumstances and defendant bears burden)
- Favia v. Indiana University of Pennsylvania, 7 F.3d 332 (3d Cir. 1993) (standards for modifying/dissolving preliminary injunctions)
- Durand v. Fairview Health Services, 902 F.3d 836 (8th Cir. 2018) (elements required to prove failure‑to‑accommodate under §504/ADA)
- DeBord v. Board of Education of Ferguson‑Florissant School District, 126 F.3d 1102 (8th Cir. 1997) (what makes a requested accommodation unreasonable)
- Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008) (four‑factor preliminary injunction test)
- Jet Midwest Int’l Co. v. Jet Midwest Group, LLC, 953 F.3d 1041 (8th Cir. 2020) (abuse‑of‑discretion review of preliminary injunction)
- Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (deprivation of in‑person education has lasting harms)