697 F.3d 514
N.D. Ill.2012Background
- Thayer and CCAWR sought permits for a March 19, 2005 antiwar march at Oak St and Michigan Ave; the city denied the permit and offered a Federal Plaza alternative.
- Thayer and Lyttle, longtime antiwar activists, were arrested at Oak and Michigan during a dispersal operation after police announced dispersal and blocked parts of the sidewalk.
- Disorderly conduct under Chicago Mun. Code § 8-4-010(d) and related liability for Lyttle (and Thayer) were pursued; Thayer was convicted of disorderly conduct and resisting arrest, Lyttle acquitted.
- The district court granted summary judgment to officers on several theories, including qualified immunity and probable cause; Lyttle’s facial challenge to subsection (d) and Thayer’s related claims were addressed.
- The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding arguable probable cause to disperse justified arrests, qualified immunity shielded the officers, and subsection (d) was partially invalidated in Bell v. Keating, rendering Lyttle’s facial challenge moot.
- Thayer’s retaliatory-arrest and class-of-one equal protection claims were resolved in favor of the defendants on qualified-immunity grounds; the court left open the question of whether a First Amendment retaliatory arrest claim can exist where probable cause is present.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether officers had probable or arguable probable cause to arrest Lyttle under subsection (d). | Lyttle asserts unlawful arrest for exercising free speech. | Officers reasonably believed three or more people were disorderly and dispersal was appropriate. | Arrest upheld; arguable probable cause and qualified immunity applied. |
| Whether the First Amendment retaliatory-arrest claim survives given probable cause. | Thayer and Lyttle were retaliated against for speech. | Probable cause and Reichle bar render claim nonviable. | Qualified immunity applies; Reichle forecloses clearly established-right theory here. |
| Whether Lyttle’s class-of-one equal protection claim survives in light of discretionary police action. | Disparate treatment based on activism. | Discretion and non-contrived reasons support conduct. | Qualified immunity; cannot show clearly established right under the particular facts. |
| Whether subsection (d) facially invalid as overbroad or vague. | Challenging facial validity of the dispersal provision. | The statute provides discretion; prior Bell v. Keating partially invalidated (d). | Moot as to Lyttle after Bell; facial challenge dismissed as moot. |
Key Cases Cited
- Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250 (U.S. 2006) (retaliation claims require causation showing; prima facie case)
- Reichle v. Howards, 132 S. Ct. 2088 (U.S. 2012) (probable cause does not establish a clearly established First Amendment right to be free from retaliatory arrest)
- DeFILlippo v. United States, 443 U.S. 368 (U.S. 1979) (probable cause standard in arrests)
- Bell v. Keating, 2012 WL 3892506 (7th Cir. 2012) (partially invalidated subsection (d) on overbreadth and vagueness grounds)
- Del Marcelle v. Brown Cnty. Corp., 680 F.3d 887 (7th Cir. 2012) (class-of-one standard — qualified immunity considerations)
- Engquist v. Oregon Dept. of Agric., 553 U.S. 591 (U.S. 2008) (discretionary decisions in public sector; limits of equal protection scrutiny)