Tharpe v. Warden, 898 F.3d 1342

Keith Tharpe challenged his death sentence on the ground that a juror (Gattie) expressed racial animus that influenced the verdict/sentence; Gattie later executed an affidavit detailing overt racial slurs and statements that race affected sentencing.
Tharpe exhausted state remedies but his juror-bias claim was raised after his conviction became final (cert. denied Oct. 19, 1992) and was ruled procedurally defaulted by Georgia courts for not being raised at trial or on direct appeal.
The panel considered whether Peña‑Rodriguez v. Colorado (recognizing a constitutional exception to the no‑impeachment rule for juror racial bias) applies retroactively to collateral review under Teague v. Lane.
The court applied the three‑step Teague framework: (1) date conviction became final; (2) whether the new rule was dictated by precedent at that time; (3) whether an exception to Teague (substantive rule or watershed procedural rule) applies.
The panel concluded Peña‑Rodriguez announced a new procedural rule not dictated by prior precedent, so it is barred by Teague because it is neither substantive nor a watershed rule; alternatively, Tharpe failed to show cause to overcome his state‑law procedural default.
The court therefore denied reconsideration of its prior order refusing a certificate of appealability (COA).

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Peña‑Rodriguez applies retroactively to Tharpe's collateral habeas claim	Tharpe: Peña‑Rodriguez creates a constitutional exception to the no‑impeachment rule that should apply to his case	Govt/State: Peña‑Rodriguez announced a new rule that was not dictated by precedent and is barred by Teague	Held: Peña‑Rodriguez does not apply retroactively under Teague
Whether Pena‑Rodriguez is a substantive rule under Teague (allowing retroactivity)	Tharpe: (argued implicitly) rule alters substantial rights warranting retroactivity	State: Rule is procedural, not substantive	Held: Not substantive; Teague exception inapplicable
Whether Peña‑Rodriguez is a "watershed" procedural rule under Teague	Tharpe: (did not press watershed claim)	State: It is not a watershed rule; standards for watershed are extremely narrow	Held: Not a watershed rule; exception fails
Whether Tharpe showed cause to excuse his procedural default	Tharpe: Trial/appellate counsel ineffective for failing to raise claim, which constitutes cause	State: Claim of ineffective assistance is conclusory and factually unsupported	Held: Tharpe failed to plead or prove specific facts showing cause; procedural default stands

Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (framework for retroactivity of new rules on collateral review)
Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518 (1997) (describes Teague three‑step process)
Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (2004) (explains narrowness of watershed‑rule exception)
Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107 (1987) (discusses historical no‑impeachment rule barring juror testimony)
McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264 (1915) (warning about dangers of allowing juror impeachment)
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977) (cause and prejudice standard to overcome procedural default)
Tharpe v. Warden, 834 F.3d 1323 (11th Cir. 2016) (prior Eleventh Circuit proceedings in Tharpe's case)
Tharpe v. State, 262 Ga. 110 (Georgia 1992) (state court proceedings affirming conviction)
Hill v. Jones, 81 F.3d 1015 (11th Cir. 1996) (procedural bar principles for federal review)
Lambrix (already listed) and related precedent on Teague exceptions cited by the court